Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 78 | Issue 5

Article 6

8-1-2003

A Question for Another Day: The Constitutionality
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines under Apprendi v.
New Jersey
Jane A. Dall

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
Jane A. Dall, A Question for Another Day: The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 78 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1617 (2003).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol78/iss5/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

NOTES
"A QUESTION FOR ANOTHER DAY": 1
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES UNDER
APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY
Jane A. Dall*
INTRODUCTION

In 1984 Congress established the U.S. Sentencing Commission in
response to concern over the disparity in criminal sentencing among
federal judges and Parole Commission sentencing reductions. 2 Congress charged the Commission with the creation of statutory guidelines for the range of sentences available to federal district courts in
their sentencing procedures 3 and charged federal judges to adhere to
the guidelines when sentencing convicted federal prisoners. 4 Pursuant to its charge, the Commission promulgated the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 and the initial guidelines took effect on November 1,
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2003. Many thanks to
Professors G. Robert Blakey and Richard Garnett for reading earlier drafts and
providing insightful comments. I would also like to thank the members of the Notre
Dame Law Review for their assistance in preparing this piece for publication and their
camaraderie throughout the year. Finally, I wish to acknowledge my deepest and
personal gratitude to my parents for their unconditional love and unwavering support
of my educational endeavors.
1 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523 (2000) (Thomas,J., concurring); see
also id. at 487 n.13.
2 The Sentencing Commission was established pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which appeared as title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-39, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended in
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3621-3625, 3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000)).
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998.
4 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
5 28 U.S.C. § 994.
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Eleven years later, the United States Supreme Court handed
down Apprendi v. New Jersey,7 which reversed a state court's sentencing
under New Jersey's hate crimes sentencing enhancer on grounds of
unconstitutionality. A broad reading of the Apprendi rationale
prompts question as to the constitutionality of sentencing under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.8
Apprendi declared unconstitutional a defendant's sentence because the determination of a key fact at sentencing led to a sentence
above the statutory range for the offense of conviction. 9 In a five-four
opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court held that any fact, other
than prior conviction, that increases punishment beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond reasonable doubt' 0-a standard that establishes both the factfinder's identity
and the prosecution's burden of proof. Apprendi and its various concurring and dissenting opinions carried additional baggage, however.
Controversy arose as to whether Apprendi's rationale had a much
broader sweep-affecting not only the use of factors to extend
sentences beyond the statutory maximum, but also the use of factors
to extend sentences beyond the statutory minimums. 1' Such a rationale could render unconstitutional sentencing under determinate
schemes such as the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, federal judges find, at the sentencing stage and by a
preponderance of evidence, the factors relevant to punishment
greater than that of the statutory minimums for conviction of federal
crimes.
The Apprendi opinions themselves noted the potential effect of
such a rationale on the Guidelines.' 2 While the Court has not specifically addressed the Guidelines in the wake of Apprendi, two years after
Apprendi, in Harrisv. United States,13 the Court affirmed the use of legislative sentencing factors. 14 While Harrisaffirmed a statutorily provided sentencing structure, the Court's decision implies the
constitutionality of sentencing under the Guidelines. The Harris
6

THOMAS W.

HUTCHISON

ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE

2

(2002).
7 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
8
9

10

See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474.

Id. at 490.

11 See, e.g., id. at 543-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12 See id. at 497 n.21; id. at 523 n.11 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 544
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 561 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

13 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
14 Id. at 568.
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opinion was quite fractured, however, and several of the writing Justices deemed Harrisinconsistent with Apprendi.15 Thus, the potential
conflict between the Sentencing Guidelines and the Apprendi decision
continues to warrant consideration.
This Note examines the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines under the Court's Apprendi decision. Part I details the history, purposes, and effects of the Sentencing Guidelines. Part II examines the Supreme Court precedent leading up to Apprendi and
analyzes the separate Apprendi opinions. Part III considers the aftermath of Apprendi in the federal circuits, particularly, the effect of Apprendi on review of sentences delivered under the Sentencing
Guidelines. Part IV argues the constitutionality of sentencing under
the Guidelines notwithstanding the Apprendi decision. The Note concludes with a policy-based reinforcement of the Sentencing Guide6
lines' constitutionality.
I.

THE ORIGINATION OF THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

No two crimes-or criminals-are alike. But should two substantially similar people who commit substantially similar crimes receive
substantially similar sentences? And if those sentences involve prison
confinement, should the convicted prisoners actually serve similar
amounts of time? Logic and a sense of fundamental fairness dictate
an affirmative response to both of these questions.
A.

History of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Before the Sentencing Guidelines took effect, judges reasonably
and routinely differed as to the appropriate amount of punishment
warranted by an individual's commission of a crime. In 1949, the Supreme Court instructed judges to consider "the fullest information
15

See infra notes 318-38.

16 This Note does not address or defend the substantive virtues of the Sentencing
Guidelines, but merely their structural constitutionality in the wake of Apprendi. For
criticism of the Guidelines, see, for example, KATE STITH &JosE A. CABRANES,FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

(1998); Jose A. Cabranes,

Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2; and Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992). For defense of the Guidelines, see, for example,
Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299 (2000); Frank 0. Bowman, III,
The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning To Love the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L.REV. 679; and Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043 (1992).
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possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."1 7 As a
result, federal judges had a great deal of discretion in declaring the
sentence for any individual criminal: "in the pre-Guidelines era,
outside of statutory maximums and constitutional limits; judges were
guided only by their own notions of justice in imposing sentences."1 8
This discretion "led to demonstrably disparate results."1 9
Evidence as early as 1933 suggested "striking differences and wide
disparity in sentence type and length." 211 Judicial decisions were
found to be influenced by "the offender's race, sex, religion, income,
education, occupation and other status characteristics."' 2 1 Indeed, researchers argued that "disparities often reflected discriminatory attitudes" and that "[r]acial discrimination would manifest itself in the
form of more severe sentences for minority defendants than for
equally situated white offenders." 22 On the other hand, some evidence suggested that other judges would "impose excessively lenient
sentences on minority defendants in an effort to remedy past societal
injustices." 23 Regardless of motivations, the evidence suggested that
gross disparity existed at the sentencing stage among federal judges. 24
Other circumstances augmented the exercise of judicial discretion. The statutory maximums were relatively broad. 25 Judges were
not required to announce reasons for their sentencing decisions. 26
17 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
18 HUTCI-IISON ET AL., supra note 6, § 10.1, at 1685; see also id. at 1687 n.6 (quoting
S. REP. No. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 ("'[Elachjudge is left
to apply his own notions of the purposes of sentencing. As a result, every day Federal
judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders with similar
histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances.'')).
19 Id. at 1685.
20 Ilene H. Nagel, StructuringSentencing Discretion: The New FederalSentencing Guidelines, 80J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOc;Y 883, 895 (1990). Professor Nagel served as Commissioner of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See id. at 883 n.*.
21 Id. at 895.
22 HurcHISON ET AL., supra note 6, § 10.1, at 1685.
23 Id.
24 Id. (quotingJudge Marvin Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV.
1, 54 (1973) ("'The evidence is conclusive that judges of widely varying attitudes on
sentencing, administering statutes that confer huge measures of discretion, mete out
widely divergent sentences where the differences are explainable only by the variations among the judges, not by material differences in the defendants or their
crimes.'")).
25 Id. Hutchison and his co-authors illustrate, "For example, judges could sentence a defendant convicted of bank robbery anywhere from straight probation to
twenty years in prison." Id. at 1687 n.2.
26 Id. at 1685 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182).
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Nor were sentences generally subject to appeal. 27 These factors combined to enhance and protect judicial sentencing discretion and to
insulate the disparities present in federal sentencing.
Not only did nominal sentences vary, but decisions of the Parole
Commission also affected the length of time served. During the time
of the Parole Commission, the criminal justice system emphasized rehabilitation of prisoners. Given this goal, the Parole Commission had
authority to release rehabilitated prisoners: "indeterminate sentencing was founded upon the theory of rehabilitation, and it could only
be applied with the liberal use of discretion. ' 28 Thus, "the Parole
Commission was vested with the authority to determine the defendant's actual release date, a decision that could reduce a defendant's
sentence to one-third or less of its nominal term." 29 The indeterminacy of these reductions potentially "duped" victims and their families
because convicted criminals' prison time could be substantially
30
shorter than their nominal sentences.
During the 1960s and 1970s, dissatisfaction with judicial discretion in sentencing and Parole Commission discretion in prison time
reductions gave rise to calls for sentencing reform. 31 Many commentators suggested the abolition of the Parole Board.3 2 In response to
these proponents of reform, Congress heard evidence in 1983 on the
33
disparity in federal criminal sentences.
B. Purposes of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 198434 emerged from
the 1983 congressional hearings. The Sentencing Reform Act ap27 Id. (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)).
28 Nagel, supra note 20, at 894.
29 HUiCHISON ET AL., supra note 6, § 10.1, at 1685 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a) (5), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984); Kate Stith & Steve K.
Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 226-27 (1993) ("With the advent of federal
parole, federal prison sentences became partially indeterminate. A court's nominal
sentence effectively determined only the minimum term (usually one-third of the
nominal sentence) and maximum term (usually two-thirds of the nominal sentence)

to be served.").
30

Id. at 1686 (quoting Panel Discussion, Equity Versus Discretion in Sentencing, 26

Am. CRIm. L. RE,. 1813, 1816 (1989) (statement by Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel)).
31 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 24; see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 53 n.74 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
32 See S. REP. No. 98-225, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.

33

See id.

34

Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of the

U.S.C.).
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peared as title II of the Crime Control Act.35 In several significant
ways, the Sentencing Reform Act changed the prior sentencing system
and its characteristic discretion. Primarily, the Act established the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, a body instructed to devise and promulgate uniform sentencing guidelines. The Crime Control Act explicitly
set forth the purposes of the Sentencing Commission:
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal
criminal justice system that(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as
set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United
States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes
of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct
while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in
meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
36
3553(a) (2) of title 18, United States Code.
The primary responsibilities of the Sentencing Commission were thus
to establish uniform sentencing guidelines and to measure the effectiveness of those sentences in the criminal justice system. Both in devising sentences and measuring their effectiveness, Congress directed
the Commission to adhere to the purposes of 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) (2).
Paragraph 3553(a)(2) of tide 18 sets forth the goals of federal
criminal punishment.3 7 Both the Sentencing Commission when
promulgating guidelines and a court when sentencing under the
guidelines must consider
The need for the sentence imposed-

35

Id. §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. at 1987.

36

28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2000).

37 Nagel referred to § 3553 (a) (2) as "the long awaited statement of the goals of
sentencing in the federal system." Nagel, supra note 20, at 901.
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(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with the needed education or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
38
treatment in the most effective manner.
The Code essentially sets forth the traditional goals of a criminal justice system-retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.3 9 Senate Report 98-225 clarifies that all factors are appropriate
considerations for sentencing: "the Committee believes that each of
the four stated purposes should be considered in imposing sentence
in a particular case."' 40 The Report further states, however, that
one purpose may have more bearing on the imposition of sentence
in a particular case than another purpose has. For example, the
purpose of rehabilitation may play an important role in sentencing
an offender to a term of probation with the condition that he participate in a particular course of study, while the purposes of just
punishment and incapacitation may be important considerations in
sentencing a repeated or violent offender to a relatively long term
4
of imprisonment. '

In a footnote, the Report brings more clarity to the significance of the
rehabilitation factor in prison time sentencing:
Section 3582(a) provides, however, in light of current knowledge
that in determining whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment
and in determining the length of a term of imprisonment, the sen18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
Nagel further explained,
The statement of specific goals was meant to provide a comprehensive statement of the federal law of sentencing. The goals of adequately reflecting the
seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for law, deterrence, and incapacitation can be assumed to have been prompted by a desire for sentencing
to be responsive to society's right to protection from criminal predation.
The goals ofjust punishment, and the provision of education, training, and
treatment can be assumed to have been prompted by a desire for fairness
and justice for the offender. The publication of and adherence to such clear
goals provided the hope for increased certainty. Finally, the range of options would be provided through certain, mandated sentencing guidelines
tied to the offense and the criminal history of the offender.
Nagel, supra note 20, at 902.
40 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 68 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
41 Id.
38
39
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tencingjudge should recognize that "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation."
Proposed section 994(k) of title 28, as enacted by section 207(a) of
this bill, provides that the sentencing guidelines should reflect the
"inappropriateness" of using rehabilitation or availability of corrections programs as the basis for imposing a term of imprisonment. 42
Thus, Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to adhere to
traditional theories of criminal punishment but, in reaction to the
perceived failures of indeterminate sentencing, limited the consideration the Commission could give to rehabilitation when determining
the length of prison sentences.
The codification of the purposes of federal sentencing was not
insignificant. Indeed, the previous lack of such a statement may have
fostered the wide disparity in sentencing: "[b]ecause no single purpose of punishment has reigned supreme, judges historically have
been accorded extremely broad discretion to select among the purposes of punishment while fashioning an appropriate sentence. ' 43
The codification of a theory of federal criminal punishment limited
that discretion in some sense by requiring a court to take into account
all theories of punishment in devising an appropriate sentence.
Yet, even in codifying the purposes of federal sentencing, Congress did not dictate one purpose or even one primary purpose of
criminal punishment. Perhaps this is so because Congress intended
an element of discretion to remain at the sentencing stage. In Senate
Report 98-225, the Committee on the Judiciary also spoke to the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines:
The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure
for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for
an individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition
of individualized sentences. Indeed, the use of sentencing guidelines will actually enhance the individualization of sentences as com4
pared to current law.4
The legislative history suggests that Congress sought not to eliminate
judicial discretion at sentencing but to limit that discretion in a meaningful and appropriate way while maintaining an individualized criminal justice system.
Beyond the statement of federal criminal punishment theory provided in 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2), Congress also set several boundaries
42
43

Id. at 67 n.140; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k).
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentenc-

ing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1941 (1988).
44 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52-53, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
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for the Commission's development of guidelines in 18 U.S.C. § 994. 45
Several of these mandates bear on the potential Apprendi challenge.
The Commission was to establish whether a fine, probation, or imprisonment was appropriate for a conviction and was to establish the
amount of a fine and term of probation or imprisonment (including
whether that term of imprisonment should run consecutively or concurrently) .46 Maximum terms of imprisonment were not to exceed
the minimum term by more than six months or twenty-five percent of
the minimum term, whichever was greater. 47 In determining the offense level, the Commission was to take into account the grade of the
offense, surrounding circumstances, the nature and degree of harm,
the community view of the gravity, public concern generated, the deterrent effect of a sentence, and the current incident level of the offense. 48 Offender categories were to include, to the extent relevant,
age, education, vocational skills, mental or emotional states, physical
conditions (including drug addiction), employment history, family
ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal
history and the extent to which criminal activity reflected that individual's livelihood. 49 The guidelines were to provide "certainty and fairness in sentencing" and were to reduce "unwarranted sentence
' 50

disparities.

The guidelines were to "reflect the fact that, in many

cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of
the offense. ' 5 1 The other provisions of § 994 pertain to additional
factors for the Commission to consider in promulgating its
52

guidelines.

Thus, with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Congress expressed an intent to combat "the tripartite problems of
disparity, dishonesty, and ...

excessive leniency" 53 and to establish a

uniform system of criminal punishment based on traditional goals of
retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Despite
the goal of uniformity, Congress also expressed a desire that the sentencing of any federal convict remain an individualized decision with
an appropriate level of judicial discretion. To this end, Congress cre45

See also Nagel, supra note 20, at 903-05.

46

28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1).

47

Id. § 994(b) (2) (excepting that "if the minimum term of the range is 30 years

or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment").
48 Id.§994(c)(1)-(7).
49 Id. § 994(d)(1)-(11).
50 Id. § 994(f).
51 Id. § 994(m).
52 See id. § 994.
53 Nagel, supra note 20, at 883.
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ated the U.S. Sentencing Commission and directed it to provide
courts guidelines with relatively narrow ranges to guide the exercise of
sentencing discretion.
C. Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines
On April 13, 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Commission presented
Congress with its proposed sentencing guidelines..5 4 Congress had six
months to propose changes in the sentencing guidelines but made no
such proposals, and so the Guidelines took effect on November 1,
1987. 5 5 In defining the Commission's statutory mission, the U.S. Sen-

tencing Guidelines Manual relates that the Act provides instruction to
the Commission in developing a rational federal sentencing process,
"the most important of which directs the Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender characteristics. '5 6 The primary purpose of the Manual, then, is to set forth the appropriate
categories of offenses and offenders for a sentencing judge to consider. Categorization of the offender and the offense yields a guide57
line range of prescribed penalty.

Section 3553(b) of title 18 requires the court to sentence an offender within the prescribed range unless "the court finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 58 The Sentencing Manual
notes the appellate consequences for such a departure:
If... a particular case presents atypical features, the Act allows the
court to depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the prescribed range. In that case, the court must specify reasons for departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). If the court sentences within the
guideline range, an appellate court may review the sentence to determine whether the guidelines were correctly applied. If the court
departs from the guideline range, an appellate court may review the
59
reasonableness of the departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
This structure provides some incentive to remain within the statutory
range prescribed by the guidelines. Presumably a court accepts the
burden of justification and increased appellate review only upon truly
54 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2 (2000).
55 Id. For a critical analysis of the efficacy of the Sentencing Guidelines in following Congress's statutory guidance, see Ogletree, supra note 43.
56 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.2.
57 Id.

58 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
59

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §

1A.2.
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atypical circumstances. 60 The burden of justification and the divergent standards of review enhance the limits on judicial discretion in
implementing the guidelines.
The Manual recognizes, to an extent, the element of artificiality
in characterizing offenses and offenders: "There is a tension . . . between the mandate of uniformity and the mandate of proportionality.
Simple uniformity-sentencing every offender to five years-destroys
proportionality." 6 1 At the same time, attempting to design a "sentenc-

ing system tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle of each case would
quickly become unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty
of punishment and its deterrent effect." 62 The Manual notes that "retreat to the simple, broad category approach" would have eliminated
the difficulty of determining which factors should be relevant to an
offense and offender's categorization, but would have violated the
very purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. 63 The Commission
chose instead to "balance the comparative virtues and vices of broad,
simple categorization and detailed, complex subcategorization, and
within the constraints established by that balance, minimize the dis60 For a discussion of the early willingness of judges to depart from the guidelines, see Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and PurposefulDepartures:Fixing a Jurisprudence
That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 21 (2000).
Professor Berman noted that,
early decisions which countenanced the exercise of departure authority were
in a decided minority. Most district courts reasoned that "valid departures
are likely to be few in number," since the Sentencing Commission "already
considered all but the most esoteric factors." Reflecting the views of many
colleagues, one sentencing judge concluded that "[i]t is clear ... that the
Sentencing Commission intended to leave the departure window open only
a crack." The courts of appeals often validated this perspective through rulings that suggested that the Commission's "heartlands" were large and left
little room for departures.... In particular, many circuits strictly construed
the Guidelines' instructions that most offender characteristics are "not ordinarily relevant" and disallowed departure on these grounds in all but the
most exceptional circumstances.
Id. at 54-55 (footnotes omitted) (collecting cases to support these conclusions); see
also infra note 132.
61

U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §

1A.3.

62 Id. The Manual further relates, "The list of potentially relevant features of
criminal behavior is long; the fact that they can occur in multiple combinations
means that the list of possible permutations of factors is virtually endless." Id. The
Manual also suggests that "the greater the number of decisions required and the
greater their complexity, the greater the risk that different courts would apply the
guidelines differently to situations that, in fact, are similar, thereby reintroducing the
very disparity that the guidelines were designed to reduce." Id'
63 Id.
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cretionary powers of the sentencing court. ' 6 4 The Commission therefore recognizes that it forecloses some of the contextual
proportionality factors that might have influenced a sentencing court
pre-guidelines but forecloses that deliberation purposefully in light of
the countervailing considerations of uniformity.
1. An Explanation
Certainly an exhaustive review of the Sentencing Guidelines is beyond the scope of this Note, but an explanation of the basic structure
is necessary for an analysis of its constitutionality under Apprendi. As
discussed above, the Guidelines provide for a range of penalties appropriate to an individual offender's conviction.135 Section 1B1.1 provides the general instructions for application of the Guidelines. 66
Upon conviction for or a guilty plea to a single offense, 6 7 the sentencing court must first determine the appropriate offense guideline
section in Chapter 2. 68 The appropriate offense guideline section
(determined from the statutory index) yields a base offense level and
describes specific offense characteristics that might increase or decrease the level. Specific offense characteristics include criminal results, degree of bodily injury, and extent of financial injury, to name
only a few. 6 9 The offense guideline section also provides cross-references and special instructions. 70 The sentencing court must adjust
the base level for circumstances related to the victim, the role of the
71
offender in the commission of the crime, and obstruction ofjustice.
If the defendant has clearly accepted responsibility for the offense, the
level is decreased. 72 After following subsections 1B1.1 (a) through (e),
the sentencing court has established the level of the offense.
The sentencing court must next categorize the offender. First,
the court must establish the defendant's criminal history category in
64

Id.

65

See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.

66

U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §

IBI.1.

67 Sentencing on multiple counts of conviction is determined in a similar matter-the level for each offense is determined by applying subsections IBlI.(a)
through (c) for each count and then the counts are grouped with appropriate adjustments under section 3D. See id. § 1Bl.1(d); see also id. § 3D.
68 See id. § lB.1.1 (a); see also id. § 11B.2; id. § 2; id. app. A.
69 See id. § 2.
70 See id. § IBl.1(b); see also, e.g., id. § 2A4.1.
71 See id. § 1B1.1 (c); see also id. §§ 3A-C.
72 See id. § IBL.I(e); see also id. § 3E. Further adjustment may be made for cooperation in the government investigation or prosecution. See id.
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section 4A. 7 The court must next adjust that category for any applicable reasons set forth in section 4B, which refers to career offenders
and criminal livelihood.7 4 The total determined points equals the
75
criminal history category of the offender.
The. sentencing court then applies the criminal history category
and the offense level to the sentencing table contained in section 5A
to determine the applicable probation and imprisonment guideline
range. 76 The court has discretion to sentence within the range provided. 77 Further sentencing requirements and options for probation,
imprisonment, supervision, fines, and restitution are provided in sections 5B through G.78 Finally, the court is directed to refer to sections
5H and K for policy statements regarding specific offender character79
istics and departures that warrant consideration in sentencing.
An Application

2.

The effect of the Sentencing Guidelines may best be seen
through an example. 80 Posit John Doe, an ex-con, who abducts a
member of Congress for publicity and ransoms the Congressman for
one million dollars, releasing him eight days after the abduction. Doe
used no dangerous weapons in the abduction, and the Congressman
was not injured. Doe pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 351(b) 8 '
three days before trial and truthfully admitted the commission of the
offense. Twenty years ago, Doe was convicted of armed robbery and
served four years.
73
74

See id. § 1B1.1(f); see also id. § 4A.
See id. § I BI.1 (f); see also id. § 4B.

75
76

Id. § 4Al.1.
See id. § 1B1.1(g)-(h); see also id. §§ 5A, 5B1.1-C1.2.

See id. ch. 5, introductory cmt.
See id. § IBI.1 (h); see also id. §§ 5B-G.
79 See id. § 1BI.1 (i); see also id. §§ 5H, K. In particular, these statements address
the appropriateness of certain considerations in sentencing outside the statutory
guidelines.
80 The example that follows is entirely and purposefully fictional. It is presented
only as an academic problem to illustrate the application of the Sentencing
77

78

Guidelines.
81 Section 351(b) of 18 U.S.C. reads,
Whoever kidnaps any individual designated in subsection (a) of this section
shall be punished (1) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or

(2) by death or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if death resuilts to such individual.

18 U.S.C. § 351(b) (2000). Subsection (a) designates "a member of Congress." Id.
§ 351 (a).
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Doe must be sentenced for a violation of § 351(b). The statute
provides for imprisonment for any term of years or for life when the
victim of the abduction does not die 82-a rather broad statutory maximum. The Sentencing Guidelines restrict judicial discretion within
this statutory maximum.
In sentencing Doe under the Guidelines, the court must first determine the applicable offense guideline.8 3 In the Statutory Index
(Appendix A), 18 U.S.C. § 351(b) references two applicable offense
guidelines: section 2A1.1 and section 2A4.1.8 4 Commentary to section
1B1.2 provides that when the Statutory Index provides more than one
offense guideline, "the court will determine which of the referenced
guideline sections is most appropriate for the offense conduct
charged in the count of which the defendant was convicted. ''8 5 Here,
the offense conduct was kidnapping. Section 2A1.1 of the Guidelines
pertains to homicide; section 2A4.1 of the Guidelines pertains to kidnapping. The court must select section 2A4.1 as the applicable offense guideline section.
Having selected the applicable offense guideline, the court must
next determine the level of the offense.8 6 Section 2A4.1 establishes
the base offense level as 24. 7 Section 2A4.1 provides several specific
offense characteristic factors as well. If a ransom demand is made, the
level increases by 6.88 Here, Doe demanded one million dollars and
therefore the offense level increases to 30. Also, if the victim is not
released within seven days, the level increases by 1.89 Because Doe did
not release the Congressman until eight days passed, the level of the
offense increases to 31. The cross reference pertains to killing of the
victim and does not apply.9 0 Thus, section 2A4.1 establishes an offense level of 31 prior to adjustment.
Next the sentencing court must make appropriate adjustments
based on victim characteristics, role of the offender in the crime, and
obstruction of justice.9 1 Section 3A1.2 provides for an increase by 3
82
83

Id. § 351(b).
See U.S. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 11.1(a). For simplicity of refer-

ence, this section will refer to the court as responsible for the determination of the
Guidelines' application. In practice, the probation and defense attorneys may negoti-

ate the computation with the court ultimately ratifying it.

84 Id. app. A.
85 Id. § 1B1.2 cmt. n.1.
86
87
88

See id. § 1B .1 (b)-(e).
Id. § 2A4.1(a).
Id. § 2A4.1(b)(1).

89

Id. § 2A4.1(b) (4) (B).

90
91

See id. § 2A4.1 (c).
See id. § IBI.1 (c); see also §§ 3A-C.
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levels if the victim was a government officer.9 2 Here, the Congressman is clearly a government officer, and Doe's offense level increases
to 34. Although section 3A1.3 provides for an adjustment increase
when the victim was physically restrained, the Commentary to that section specifically provides that the adjustment does not apply to offenses covered by section 2A4.1, 9 3 the offense category applicable to
Doe. The remaining victim-related adjustments-hate crime motivation or vulnerable victim 9 4-do not apply to Doe's offense. Nor do
any of the role adjustments apply. 95 Furthermore, Doe did not interfere with the investigation or prosecution of the crime or risk human
life in fleeing law enforcement, and therefore no adjustments are appropriate under section 3C1. 96 After section 1BL.1(c) adjustments,
the offense level stands at 34.
The court must next make any adjustments required by the offender's acceptance of responsibility. 97 Doe pled guilty to a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 351 (b) three days before trial and truthfully admitted
the conduct of the offense. Under section 3El.1(a), Doe is entitled to
a two-level decrease because he has demonstrated "acceptance of responsibility for his offense."9 8 While Doe may contend that he is entifled to an additional one-level decrease under section 3E1.1(b) (2), his
acceptance of the plea bargain three days before the trial likely has
not saved the government time and expense in preparing for trial,
and consequently he is likely not entitled to the additional one-level
decrease. 9 9 Doe's offense level after all adjustments thus stands at 32.
92

Id. § 3A1.2(a).

93

Id. § 3A1.3, cmt. 2.

94 See id. § 3Al.1.
95 See id. § 3B1.1-.4. Doe was the sole criminal actor in no position of trust, and
he possessed no special skills. The adjustments for an aggravating role require additional participants in the criminal activity, abuse of a trust position, or use of a special
skill. See id. § 3B1.1.
96 See id. § 3C.
97

See id. § 1Bt.l(e).

98

Id. § 3EL.1(a); see also id. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3.

99

See id. § 3E1.1(b)(2). The Commentary states,
In general, the conduct qualifying for a decrease in offense level under subsection (b) (1) or (2) will occur particularly early in the case. For example,
to qualify under subsection (b) (2), the defendant must have notified authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty at a sufficiently early point in
the process so that the government may avoid preparing for trial and the
court may schedule its calendar effectively.

Id., cmt. n.6. Three days is likely not sufficient time for the government to avoid
preparing for trial or for the court to effectively schedule its calendar. See, e.g.,
United States v. Smith, 245 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir. 2001) (entering guilty plea five

days before trial was not timely for purposes of section 3El.l(b) adjustment).
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Having determined the offense level, the sentencing court next
must determine the criminal history category factor.""' Doe has a
criminal record and served four years on a conviction twenty years
ago. Section 4A1.1 directs the sentencing court to "[a] dd 3 points for
each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one
month."' " The Sentencing Guidelines further define prior convictions as "any sentence previously imposed. '' 12 Prior sentences of imprisonment are counted if they were imposed within fifteen years of
the commencement of the offense at hand or if the offender was incarcerated during any portion of the previous fifteen years. 10 3
Sentences outside that timeframe are not counted.1 0 4 Here, Doe committed the crime twenty years after being sentenced to prison for
armed robbery and sixteen years after his release. Thus, his prior conviction will not be counted for the purposes of section 4A1.1. 1 °15 The
career offender and criminal livelihood provisions of section 4B1 similarly do not apply, 10 6 and so Doe will have zero criminal history points.
Section 1BI.1 (g) requires the sentencing court to determine the
appropriate guideline range according to the sentencing table provided in section 5A, based on the previously determined offense level
and criminal history category.' 0 7 Applying an offense level of 32 and a
criminal history category of I (based on zero criminal history points)
yields a Zone D statutory range of 121 to 151 months of imprisonment
(or ten years, one month to twelve years, seven months of imprisonment).""1s This range clearly restricts the judicial discretion provided

for in 18 U.S.C § 351(b). 11'
Should the sentencing court have concerns that "there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described," the court may undertake an upward or downward departure from the guidelines."
Here, Doe abducted a federal
elected official. Possibly the disruption of the federal government and
100

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.I (f).

101
102

Id. § 4A.I(a).
Id. § 4AL.2(a)(1).

103
104

Id.§ 4AL.2(e)(1).
Id.§ 4AL .2(e) (3).

105 See id.; see also id. § 4A1.1, cmt. n.1.
106 See id. § 4B1.
107 See id. § IBl.I(g).
108 See id. § 5A.
109 18 U.S.C. § 351(b) (2000) (stating that offenders "shall be punished . . . by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life").

10

Id.§ 3553(b).
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the public's deprivation of one of its elected representatives warrants
an upward departure." 1I Then again, the Commentary to section
3A1.2 regarding official victims discusses the appropriateness of an
upward departure for victimization of a "high-level official, e.g., the
President and Vice President";'1 2 perhaps victimization of a single Congressman does not rise to the level of severity required for an upward
departure. Should the court choose to impose an upward departure,
it must articulate its reasons for so doing, " 3 and its departure is subject to appellate review on grounds of reasonableness. 1 4 If the court
declines to depart from the statutory range and sentences the defendant to, say, eleven years, the court is effectively subject only to appellate review on the correctness of its application of the Sentencing
5

Guidelines. 1'

D. Notable Features of the Sentencing Guidelines
Having explained and applied a sentencing determination under
the Guidelines, it is appropriate to discuss in greater detail several of
the features of the Guidelines that may bear upon the constitutionality of sentencing under them. Several of these features are set forth in
the Manual's "Introduction" to the Sentencing Guidelines.'1 6
1. The Virtues of a Charge Offense System
The Sentencing Commission reports that, in devising the guidelines, it deliberated on the comparative virtues of a charge offense
system and a real offense system.' 17 A charge offense system emphasizes the conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense while a
real offense system emphasizes the conduct in which the defendant
engaged."l 8 The example the Guidelines Manual provides is
informative:
§ 3A1.2, cmt. n.2 ("Certain high-level
although covered by this section, do
President,
and
Vice
President
officials, e.g., the
11]

See U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

not represent the heartland of the conduct covered. An upward departure to reflect
the potential disruption of the governmental function in such cases typically would be
warranted.").

112

Id. (emphasis added). This recommendation represents a guided departure.

See id. § 1A4(b) (discussing guided and unguided departures).
113 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2).
114 See id. § 3742(e)(3).
115 See id. § 3742(a) (2). An appellate court may also review whether the sentence
"was imposed in violation of the law." Id. § 3742 (a)(1).
116 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A.

117
118

Id. § 1A4(a).
Id.
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A bank robber, for example, might have used a gun, frightened bystanders, taken $50,000, injured a teller, refused to stop when ordered, and raced away damaging property during his escape. A
pure real offense system would sentence on the basis of all identifiable conduct. A pure charge offense system would overlook some
of the harms that did not constitute statutory elements of the offenses of which the defendant was convicted.' 19
Presumably sentencing under a real offense system might warrant additional punishment because the additional harms are considered in
sentencing. The Guidelines Manual describes the pre-guidelines sentencing system as a real offense system: "[t]he sentencing court and
the parole commission took account of the conduct in which the defendant actually engaged, as determined in a presentence report, at
the sentencing hearing, or before a parole commission hearing officer."' 12 The Commission initially attempted to develop a real offense system, but ultimately abandoned those efforts after it "found no
practical way to combine and account for the large number of diverse
harms arising in different circumstances" and no "practical way to reconcile the need for a fair adjudicatory procedure with the need for a
speedy sentencing process given the potential existence of hosts of
1' 2 1
adjudicated 'real harm' facts in many typical cases."
The Commission instead "moved closer to a charge offense system."' 2 2 The system devised by the Commission incorporates real offense elements, however. First, the applicable offense categories are
generic and reflective of actual conduct, rather than described in
purely statutory language, given the "overlapping and duplicative"
provisions of federal criminal law.'123 Second, the usage of alternative
base offense levels, specific offense characteristics, cross references,
and adjustments "take[s] account of a number of important, commonly occurring real offense elements."' 124 Thus, the Commission
based the Guidelines on a charge offense system for reasons of practicality and simplicity, but refined the Guidelines by implementing elements of a real offense system.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.; see also Ogletree, supra note 43, at 1949 (noting that the proposed guidelines based on a real offense system were "widely criticized on the grounds that they
were inflexible, probably unconstitutional, difficult to administer, and overly harsh
compared to existing sentencing practices").
122 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(a).
123 Id.; see also id. ch. 2, introductory cmt.
124 Id. § 1A4(a) (noting real offense characteristics such as "role in the offense,
the presence of a gun, or the amount of money actually taken").
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Adjustments and Departures

In sentencing defendants, courts must make appropriate adjust125
ments under the Guidelines on the basis of offense characteristics
and may depart from the guideline ranges if the court determines that
the Commission did not adequately consider an aggravating or mitigating circumstance in formulating the Guidelines. 12 6 The adjustments and the departures require the sentencing court to consider
real offense elements of the conviction.
When conduct relevant to adjustments under the guidelines is in
dispute,1 27 the court must give the parties an opportunity to present
information regarding that conduct and must resolve the dispute at
the sentencing hearing.12 8 The Commentary to section 6A1.3 relates
that "[t]he Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements
and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the
guidelines to the facts of a case."' 129 Disputed relevant offense characteristics that form the basis for required sentencing adjustments are
thus to be proven to the judge under the preponderance standard.
Departures, on the other hand, may be warranted when the court
finds atypical aggravating or mitigating circumstances not adequately
considered by the guidelines.'3 1° The Commission developed the
guidelines with a generic offense in mind and expected courts to depart from the guidelines when the specific offense was not appropriately described:
[t]he Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each
guideline as carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds
an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically
applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the
court may consider whether a departure is warranted.' 3 '
125

See id. § 1B1.1(b)-(e).

126

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).

127

For example, in the hypothetical sentencing in Part I.C.2, did the defendant

demand a ransom?
128 U.S. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 6A1.3.

129 Id., cmt. But see HUTCHISON ET AL., supra note 6, § 6A1.3 cmt, f(6), at 1528-33
(discussing the continued validity of this statement after Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000)).
130 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1A4(b),
1 1.1 (i).
131 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(b).

1636

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:5

Offenses outside the heartland of the applicable guideline offenses
may thus warrant departure from the guideline ranges because the
13 2
crime is not adequately described by the Guidelines.
The Commission envisions two types of departures: guided and
unguided. 133 Guided departures result from "instances in which the
guidelines provide specific guidance for departure by analogy or by
other numerical or non-numerical suggestions." 3 4 Section 4A1.3 provides for departures based on criminal history not accurately reflected
in criminal history points.13 5 Other miscellaneous departure suggestions are located within the offense guidelines. 1 36 On the other hand,
an unguided departure has not been specifically considered by the
Commission: "[i] t may rest upon grounds referred to in Chapter Five,
Part K (Departures) or on grounds not mentioned in the guidelines."'1 37 Chapter Five, Part K provides policy statements discussing
the appropriateness of departures based on factors ranging from substantial assistance to authorities to dismissed and uncharged conduct.' ' Similar to adjustments, the Commission has stated that it
believes the judge under a preponderance standard may resolve disputes regarding the grounds justifying a departure. 't In sum, the adjustments and departures require judicial factfinding after conviction.

132 A plentiful amount of judicial and scholarly debate surrounds departure jurisprudence and is beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81 (1996); Berman, supra note 60; Frank 0. Bowman, III, DepartingIs Such Sweet
Sorrow: A Year ofJudicial Revolt on "SubstantialAssistance" DeparturesFollows a Decade of
Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 SruTSON L. REV. 7 (1999); Michael Goldsmith & Marcus
Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The Problem of DisparateDepartures, 69 GEO. WASF. L. REv. 57 (2000).
133 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA4(b).
134 Id. An example of a guided departure was previously provided in Part I.C.2.
See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
135 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3. Hutchison and his co-authors
point out that a guided section 4A1.3 departure warrants an increase on the horizontal axis of the sentencing table while unguided departures under section 5K2.0 are
"not tied to specified increases or decreases to other levels in the sentencing grid.
Rather, such departures are limited only by any maximums or minimums imposed by
the statutes of conviction and by the appellate review standard of reasonableness."
HurcIliSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 10.4, at 1701.
136 See HUTCHISON ET AL., supra note 6, § 10.4(a), at 1700-01.
137 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(b).
138 See id. §§ 5K1.1-5K2.21.
139 See id. § 6A1.3, cmt.; see also Ethan Glass, Whatever Happened to the Trial byJuty?
The Unconstitutionality of Upward Departures Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
37 GONZ. L. REV. 343, 349-51 (2002); supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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The Apprendi Challenge

As discussed, the adjustments and departures modify the charge
offense structure of the Guidelines based on real offense factors. The
judge typically finds these factors at sentencing on a preponderance
standard, and these factors can increase the level of punishment for
the conviction. In the wake of Apprendi v. New Jersey,1411 this aspect of
the Guidelines has come under some constitutional challenge. In Apprendi, the Court held that only a jury could find under a reasonable
doubt standard a factor that increased the offender's punishment beyond the statutory maximum. 141 Commentators have characterized
the rationale of Apprendi, however, as standing for the broader proposition that "it is wrong to convict a person of one crime and impose
punishment for another. ' 142 This broader proposition might require
any factor that increased the offender's punishment to be charged
against the defendant and decided by ajury under a reasonable doubt
standard. Such a broad reading of the Apprendi rationale implicates
the constitutionality of the relevant characteristics, adjustment, and
departure provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. Under the Guidelines, a judge determines the relevant factors under a preponderance
of the evidence standard at sentencing, and those determinations
could lead to an increased sentence (above the statutory minimum).
While two of the Court's recent decisions, Ring v. Arizona 143 and Harris v. United States,' 44 help illuminate the extent of the Apprendi holding, they do not conclusively resolve the potential conflict of Apprendi
and sentencing under the Guidelines. 145 The Apprendi decision must
therefore be examined in detail.
II.

How

BROAD

IS

THE HOLDING OF APPRENDI V. NEw JERSEY?

The Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey on June 26,
2000.141 Since that decision, the question of the import of Apprendi
on the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines has
arisen. 147 The question is prompted by a perceived disjunction be140
141
142

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
id. at 490.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Review: A Dramatic Change in Sentencing Prac-

tices, TRIAL, Nov. 2000, at 102, 104.
143 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
144
145
146
147

536 U.S. 545 (2002).
See infra Part III.A.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466.
See, e.g., Rosemary T. Cakmis & Fritz Scheller, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 53
MERCER L. REV. 1413, 1413 & n.5 (2002); Chemerinsky, supra note 142 passim; Glass,
supra note 139, at 358-61; Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentenc-
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tween the stated holding of Apprendi and its central rationale.1 48 Indeed, the various concurring and dissenting opinions of Apprendi
prompt the question. 149 The Apprendi opinions are best understood
in light of the decision's relevant precedent.
A.
1.

The Relevant Precedent of Apprendi

In re Winship and the Due Process Constitutional Standard

In 1970, the Supreme Court held that every element of a crime
must be proven to a jury beyond reasonable doubt.15°1 More specifically, the Court stated that "every fact necessary to constitute the
crime" must be proved under the reasonable doubt standard. 1 5' The
court reasoned that such a requirement played a "vital role" in the
criminal justice system: "a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission
of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt."'1 52 The

Court went to some length to ensure the interpretation of its decision:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
15 3
crime with which he is charged.
Thus, the Court stated for the first time that the Constitution required
the reasonable doubt standard of proof.
Only Justice Black dissented as to the necessity of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 5 4 Relying on his interpretation of total-and literal-incorporation, Justice Black rejected the majority's constitutional assertion of the reasonable doubt standard:
The Bill of Rights, which in my view is made fully applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment ...does by express language

provide for, among other things, a right to counsel in criminal triing Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615 passim (2002);
Analisa Swan, Note, Apprendi v. New Jersey, The Scaling Back of the Sentencing Factor
Revolution and the Resurrectionof CriminalDefendant Rights, How FarIsToo Far?, 29 PEPP.
L. REV. 729 passim (2002).
148 See Chemerinsky, supra note 142, at 104.
149 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 523 & n.l (Thomas,J.,
concurring); id. at 523-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 555 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
150 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 363-64.
153 Id. at 364.
154 Id. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting).
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als, a right to indictment, and the right of a defendant to be informed of the nature of the charges against him. And in two places
the Constitution provides for trial by jury, but nowhere in that document is there any statement that conviction of crime requires proof
1 55
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart also dissented, their
concerns pertained to the narrower holding in Winship-that the constitutional standard applied to juvenile proceedings.1 56 Thus, despite
its dissents, Winship stands for the principle that the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact constituting an
element of an offense. Given such a standard, the subsequent Supreme Court cases wrestle with who carries what burdens of proof and
57
what constitutes an element of an offense.'
2.

Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Prosecution's Burden

In Mullaney v. Wilbur,1 5 8 a statutory scheme effectively required a
defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence provocation upon
heat of passion in order to reduce a felonious murder conviction to
manslaughter. 159 The Court held that the prosecution was required
to carry the burden of proof as to the absence of heat of passion.160
Acknowledging that proving a negative might be difficult for the prosecution, the Court stated that, "to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is
far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as a murderer
than to sentence a murderer for the lesser crime of manslaughter." 16
Mullaney stands for the proposition that the prosecution must carry
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to every factual
element of the offense. A fortiori, a statutory scheme cannot shift the
burden of proof as to an element of the offense.
155

Id. (BlackJ., dissenting). Justice Black further noted, "As I have said time and

time again, I prefer to put my faith in the words of the written Constitution itself
rather than to rely on the shifting, day-to-day standards of fairness of individual
judges." Id. at 378 (Black,J., dissenting). While proof beyond a reasonable doubt has
become firmly entrenched in modern constitutional criminal traditions, it is interesting to reflect upon this historic voice of dissent. IfJustice Black had the better argument in Winship, the constitutionality of adjustments and departures under the

Sentencing Guidelines becomes less significant.
156

See id. at 375-76 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).

157

Hailed as "one of the most important U.S. Supreme Court decisions in years,"

Chemerinsky, supra note 142, at 102, Apprendi, at its most basic level, is merely one of

a line of decisions defining what constitutes an element of an offense.

158 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
159 Id. at 684-85.
160
161

Id. at 704.
Id. at 703-04.
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Patterson v. New York and Affirmative Defense Burden-Shifting

Although Mullaney establishes that the prosecution must carry
the burden of proof as to every element of the offense, 162 Patterson v.
New York 163 clarifies that defendants carry the burden of proof as to
affirmative defenses. 61 4 New York required a defendant charged with
murder to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he acted under
extreme emotional disturbance and was instead guilty of manslaughter. The Court explained that due process did not require the prosecution to disprove the existence of that factor:
Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's
interests against those of the accused have been left to the legislative
branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is
charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has
never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to
fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense
16 5
at issue here.

Thus, Mullaney did not require the prosecution to carry a reasonable
doubt standard as to all relevant facts-only those constituting an element of the offense. Absence of an affirmative defense was not an

element of the offense and the state was not required to describe it as
66
such. 1
162 See supra Part II.A.2.
163 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
164 id. at 210.
165 Id. The Court also made the following comment in a footnote which bears
some relevance to the extent of the Apprendi decision:
There is some language in Mullaney that has been understood as perhaps
construing the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting "the degree of criminal culpability." ... It is said that such a rule would deprive legislatures of any discretion
whatsoever in allocating the burden of proof, the practical effect of which
might be to undermine legislative reform of our criminal justice system....
The Court did not intend Mullaney to have such far-reaching effect.
Id. at 214 n.15 (citations omitted). The Court was not referring to sentencing reform-it specifically mentioned changes to the burdens of proof on the felony-murder rule and sentencing reform that occurred post-Patterson-but the limits of
Mullaney are clearly referenced in this footnote.
166 In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,477 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court suggested that "Patterson teaches that we should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from
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McMillan v. Pennsylvania and the Use of Sentencing Factors

In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,1137 the Court upheld the use of "sentence factors," proved by a preponderance of evidence to the court at
sentencing, to create mandatory minimum sentences. 168 Defendants
brought a due process challenge to the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Act and its imposition of a mandatory sentence if a person "visibly possessed a firearm" during the offense of conviction because the
Act effectively increased their sentences (within the statutory range
for their convictions) based on a fact not proven to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. 69
Noting that the state could have made, but chose not to make,
visible possession of a firearm an element of the offense, the Court
proceeded under Patterson.171 In reaffirming the power of the state to
define its criminal offenses, the Court recognized the existence of
constitutional limits, but stated,
While we have never attempted to define precisely the constitutional limits noted in Patterson, i.e., the extent to which due process
forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal cases, and do not do so today, we are persuaded by several factors that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act does
17 1
not exceed those limits.
The Court upheld the sentencing factor system because the
Mandatory Minimum Act created no presumptions nor relieved the
prosecution of its burden of proving guilt. 1 72 The Court concluded its
Mullaney and Patterson discussion by stating,
The Pennsylvania Legislature did not change the definition of any
existing offense. It simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment-the instrumentality used in committing a violent felony-and dictated the
precise weight to be given that factor if the instrumentality is a firearm. Pennsylvania's decision to do so has not transformed against
its will a sentencing factor into an "element" of some hypothetical

"offense.1

73

pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties."
Id. at 86.
167 Id. at 79.
168 Id. at 91-92.
169 Id. at 84.

170
171
172
173

Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 89-90.
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Additional considerations of the Court bear some repetition. In response to the defendants' subsidiary challenge that due process required proof beyond the preponderance standard, the Court stated,
"Pennsylvania has deemed a particular fact relevant and prescribed a
particular burden of proof. We see nothing in Pennsylvania's scheme
that would warrant constitutionalizing burdens of proof at sentencing." 174 In response to the defendants' claim that they were effectively
denied a jury trial the Court quickly determined, "Having concluded
that Pennsylvania may properly treat visible possession as a sentencing
consideration and not an element of any offense, we need only note
that there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even
where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact."' 175 These comments indicate that a sentencing court may find facts relevant only to
sentencing based on a preponderance standard and will not violate
due process or the right to a jury trial by so doing.
Because Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in Apprendi, his dissent in McMillan warrants some consideration. Justice
Stevens rejected the majority's conclusion that the visible possession
of the firearm was not an element of the offense:
Because the Pennsylvania statute challenged in this case describes
conduct that the Pennsylvania Legislature obviously intended to
prohibit, and because it mandates lengthy incarceration for the
same, I believe that the conduct so described is an element of the
criminal offense to which the proof beyond a reasonable doubt re76
quirement applies.'

Justice Stevens reasoned that if a factor "shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a special punishment, that component must be
treated as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime"' governed by the
1 77
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard of In re Winship.
Under Justice Stevens's reasoning, sentencing factors that create
a special stigma and lead to special punishment 178 constitute elements
1 7
of the offense. 9
174 Id. at 91-92.
175 Id. at 93.
176 Id. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 103 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
178 In McMillan, Justice Stevens regarded the increase from eleven and one-half
months to five years as constitutionally significant. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 In tandem, proof of sentencing factors by a preponderance standard under the
Sentencing Guidelines to create "special stigma" and impose "special punishment"
would be unconstitutional under the mandate of Winship. Justice Stevens enunciated
his position even more clearly in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999)
(Stevens, .J.,
concurring) ("I am convinced that it is unconstitutional for a legislature
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5. Jones v. United States and Increasing the Statutory Maximum
One year prior to Apprendi, the Court suggested in Jones v. United
States 8 ° that any factor beyond recidivism 1 8' that increases the statutory maximum penalty for a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.1l 2 Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by the Chief
Justice, and Justices O'Connor and Breyer.1'8 3 The Court began its
discussion with statutory analysis that characterized the offense statute
as actually providing three separate offenses with individual elements
rather than one substantive offense with statutory maximums based
on sentencing factors. 18 4 Because the majority construed the statute
as effectively providing three separate offenses with distinct elements,
the elements specific to each offense had to be charged in an indict85
ment, proven beyond reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury.
Before reaching this conclusion, the majority emphasized the role of
juries. 186 Nonetheless, the majority concluded with this statement:
to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts
must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
180 Id. at 227 (5-4 decision).
181 The Court had previously affirmed the constitutionality of sentencing increases
based on prior criminal convictions not charged in the indictment of the present
offense. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (5-4 decision).
In Almendarez-Torres, the Court reasoned that recidivism was a traditional basis for
increasing punishment, that Congress had the authority to authorize a longer sentence for recidivism, and that such a statutory scheme did not create significantly
great unfairness. Id. at 243-46.
182 Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6 ("[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to ajury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.").
183 Id. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). At oral argument for Jones, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Breyer questioned the constitutional effect on the Guidelines
of holding that all statutory facts are elements. See Arguments Heard, 64 CRIM. L. REP.
2043, 2044 (BNA) (Oct. 21, 1998); see also Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searchingfor the "Tail of the Dog": Finding "Elements" of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 1057, 1061 n.21 (1999) (noting the Justices' concerns
and attempting to distinguish McMillan sentencing factors as statutorily enacted from
the Guidelines sentencing factors as statutorily allowed).
184 See 18 U.S.C.A § 2119 (West Supp. 2001) (prohibiting carjacking and mandating separate statutory maximum punishments for carjacking, carjacking accompanied
by bodily injury, and carjacking accompanied by death).
185 Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52.
186 Id. at 242-48. The Court concluded, "[D]iminishment of the jury's significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range would
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It is not, of course, that anyone today would claim that every fact
with a bearing on sentencing must be found by a jury; we have resolved that general issue and have no intention of questioning its
resolution. The point is simply that diminishment of the jury's significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory
sentencing range would resonate with the claims of earlier contro87
versies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled.'
The Court thus foreshadowed the Apprendi controversy.
B.

The Apprendi Opinions

The Court decided Apprendi five to four."8 It fractured along
what might be considered non-ideological lines: Justice Stevens wrote
the majority opinion, and Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined in that opinion; Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring
opinion; Justice Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion, in which
Justice Scalia joined as to Parts I and II; Justice O'Connor filed a dissent; ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Breyerjoined
her dissent, and Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion,
in which ChiefJustice Rehnquistjoined. 189 The factual and procedural background of Apprendi and the five opinions are examined separately below.
1.

The Facts and Procedural History of Apprendi

In 1994, an African-American family moved into a previously allwhite neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey.I )( On December 22,
1994, at 2:04 A.M., several .22 caliber shots were fired into the family's
home.' 9 1 Police arrested Charles C. Apprendi, Jr., almost immediately, and at 3:05 A.M., Apprendi admitted that he had fired the
shots.t 92 Three hours later, at 6:04 A.M., Apprendi admitted to an
interrogating officer that "because they are black in color he does not
want them in the neighborhood."1'1)3
A grand jury charged Apprendi with twenty-three offenses of differing degrees. '91 4 The charges alleged shootings on four different
resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment
issue not yet settled." Id. at 248.
187 Id.
188 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 469.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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dates and the unlawful possession of various weapons.' 9 5 No charges
alleged that Apprendi acted with a racially biased purpose, and no
96
charges referred to New Jersey's hate crimes statute.1
Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of second-degree unlawful
firearm possession and one count of third-degree unlawful antipersonnel bomb possession.' 97 The prosecutor dismissed the grand
jury's twenty other counts. 91 8 In addition, the prosecutor reserved the
right to request the sentencing court to impose an "enhanced" sentence under New Jersey's hate crimes statute' 99 for the charge stemming from the December 22 shooting, on the ground that the
0 The defense
shooting was racially biased.2 11
reserved the right to con21
test such an enhancement as unconstitutional.
At a plea hearing, the trial court explained the maximum
2 The prosecution
sentences and accepted the three guilty pleas. 211
then moved for sentence enhancement under the hate crimes statute
for the charge relating to the December 22 shooting.2 0

3

Without en-

hancement, Apprendi was subject to a ten-year maximum sentence on
the shooting count; with enhancement, Apprendi was subject to a tenyear minimum and twenty-year maximum sentence on that count. 20 4
At an evidentiary hearing on Apprendi's "purpose" for committing the December 22 shooting, the prosecution presented police officer testimony of Apprendi's interrogation, in which he confessed to
have acted "because they are black in color." 20

5

The defense

presented psychological and character evidence that Apprendi did
not have a reputation for racial bias.2 0 6 Apprendi himself testified
and explained that the shooting was alcohol-induced and that the police officer's testimony did not accurately describe his statement. 20 7
The trial court found the prosecution's evidence more credible and
found "that the crime was motivated by a racial bias."2 8 The court
195
196
197

Id.
Id.
Id. at 469-70.

198

Id. at 470.

199

N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000), deleted by amendment
2001 NJ. Laws 443.
200 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 474.
205 Id. at 469.
206
207
208

Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 471.
Id.
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then sentenced Apprendi to twelve years on the shooting charge and
20 9
to shorter concurrent sentences on the remaining two charges.
Apprendi challenged his sentence on grounds of unconstitutionality. Relying upon In re Winship, he argued that the Due Process
Clause required a jury to find beyond reasonable doubt the bias that
supported his sentence enhancement. 21 0 A divided NewJersey Appellate Court upheld the constitutionality of the enhancement, terming
it a "sentencing factor" and finding it within the boundaries of McMil21
lan v. Pennsylvania. '
The NewJersey Supreme Court affirmed. 2 12 The NewJersey Supreme Court noted that placement of a criminal component within
sentencing provisions did not necessarily mean that the component
was not an element of the offense. 21 3 The state supreme court nonetheless decided that the hate crimes enhancer was valid under McMillan and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 214 because the enhancer did
not impermissibly shift burdens and did not "'create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty."' 2 1 5 The dissent found the enhancer unconstitutional because the purpose behind the defendant's
action related to a mental state and "'must be characterized as an element'" of the crime.2 1 6 The dissent also noted that because the finding of the racially biased purpose significantly increased the penalty
range, it should have been treated as an element of the offense. 217
The dissent concluded that "'there can be little doubt that the sentencing factor applied to this defendant-the purpose to intimidate a
victim because of race-must fairly be regarded as an element of the
crime requiring inclusion in the indictment and proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' 218 The Supreme Court granted certiorari2 1 9 and
2211
reversed.
209
210

Id.
Id.
d.; see NewJersey

211
v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997),
affd, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
212 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 472; see New Jersey v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999),
rev'd, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
213 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 472; see Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 492.
214 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
215 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 473 (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 494).
216 Id. (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 498).
217 Id. (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 498).
218 Id. at 474 (quoting Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 512).
219 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
220 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474.
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The Majority Opinion

The majority held New Jersey's hate crimes sentencing enhancer
unconstitutional. 22 1 The Court began its analysis by asking whether
Apprendi had a constitutional right to have a jury find racial bias
under the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard,222 and suggested that the answer was foreshadowed in Jones v. United States:
"'under the Due Process Clause ...any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." 223 The majority thus framed the issue as a challenge to the criminal defendant's well-established rights to jury trial
224
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court examined the "novelty" of the New Jersey hate crimes
enhancement scheme under historical verdict and sentencing procedures. 225 Because application of the enhancer exposed the defendant
to a greater penalty-an additional ten years-than the penalty prescribed for the crime of conviction-a maximum of ten years-the
enhancement in effect became an element of the offense and required proof beyond a reasonable doubt to ajury.2 26 The Court held,
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
227
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
In reaching this conclusion, the majority made several other comments relevant to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines.
First, the Court generally affirmed judicial discretion in sentencing
within statutory ranges:
We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is
impermissible for judges to exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have
often noted that judges in this country have long exercised discre221 Id. at 497.
222 Id. at 475-76.
223 Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
224 Id. at 477-78.
225 Id. at 482-83. The Court noted that the McMillan "sentencing factors" decision did not protect the New Jersey statutory scheme because the Court in McMillan
had noted constitutional limits to the state's authority to define away elements of the
crime. Id. at 486. Particularly, the Court noted that facts kept from the jury that
expose the defendant to greater punishment could raise constitutional problems. Id.
226 Id. at 490.
227 Id.
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tion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the
228
individual case.

The Court thus indicated Apprendi's formal limit: sentences within the
statutory range specified by the offense of conviction fall within the
sentencing court's discretion. Second, in a footnote, the Court denied that it overruled McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the case that allowed
the court to decide "sentencing factors" under a preponderance
standard:
The principal dissent accuses us of today "overruling McMillan."
We do not overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do
not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict-a
limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself. Conscious of
the likelihood that legislative decisions may have been made in reliance on McMillan, we reserve for another day the question whether
stare decisis considerations preclude reconsideration of its narrower
9

holding.22

Thus, while the majority called into question the use of sentencing
factors found by a judge upon a preponderance of evidence standard
to increase a sentence within the statutory range, the Court had an
opportunity to overrule McMillan and did not do so.2311
Finally, the Court specifically rejected Justice O'Connor's suggestion in dissent that the Court's reasoning determined the unconstitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines:
The principal dissent, in addition, treats us to a lengthy disquisition
on the benefits of determinate sentencing schemes, and the effect
of today's decision on the federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court. We therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this Court has already
held.

23

'I

The majority thus declined to extend its reasoning to the Guidelines.
228 Id. at 481 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (noting the
trial court's historically wide discretion to sentence within the limits of the law)).
229 Id. at 487 n.13 (internal citations omitted) (discussing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)).
230 In Harrisv. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), the Court explicitly declined to
overrule McMillan. See infra notes 317-33 and accompanying text.
231 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21 (citing Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511,
515 (1998) (suggesting that the defendant might have statutory and constitutional
claims if a sentence imposed under the Guidelines exceeds the statutory maximum
because "a maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the
Guidelines")).
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In sum, the Court held that New Jersey must have charged and
proven racial bias to a jury beyond reasonable doubt in order to enhance Apprendi's sentence beyond the statutory maximum. In reaching this conclusion, the majority claimed that it did not overrule
McMillan and that it had not decided the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines.
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion and also issued a separate concurrence "in response to Justice Breyer's dissent."232 Justice
Scalia characterized Justice Breyer's dissent as one "prepared to leave
criminal justice to the State."' 2 33 In response, Justice Scalia emphasized the fundamentality of the right to a jury trial:
the criminal will never get more punishment than he bargained for
when he did the crime, and his guilt of the crime (and hence the
length of the sentence to which he is exposed) will be determined
beyond a reasonable doubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of his fellow
23 4
citizens.

In describing this process,Justice Scalia twice referred to the fact-finding function of the jury. First, he described the historic guarantee of
jury-trial fact-finding as "the right to have ajury determine those facts
that determine the maximum sentence the law allows." 23

5

Three

sentences later, Justice Scalia concluded that the constitutional guarantee "has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts
which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally pre' 23 6
scribed punishment must be found by the jury."
Only Justice Scalia's second description questions the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines. Justice Scalia suggested that
"all the facts" that "subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the

jury."2

-' 7

This category could include

facts that determine adjustments and departures under the Sentencing Guidelines. Facts relevant to adjustments and departures do subject a defendant to prescribed punishment ranges under the
Guidelines. Without a finding of such facts, the prescribed sentencing
range (under the Guidelines) might be lower. Determination of facts
relevant to adjustments and departures does not, however, subject the
232

Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).

233

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

234 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
235
236
237

Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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defendant to increased punishment outside the statutory range for
the offense of conviction. Justice Scalia's concern for "facts" that "subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment" should therefore be read narrowly and in light of his first description of the
factfinding function: the jury finds "those facts that determine the
maximum sentence the law allows." 238 Although judicial fact finding
under the Guidelines may subject the defendant to higher ranges
under the Guidelines, the judge is not finding facts that subject the defendant to a higher statutory maximum. Thejury has already found the
facts that determine the statutory maximum; the judge finds facts that
determine sentencing within that statutory range.
4. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence, parts of which
Justice Scalia joined. Justice Thomas urged the Court to adopt "a
broader rule." 23

9

Noting that the definition of the elements of a

crime determined the scope of the jury's domain,2 40 Justice Thomas
asserted that all facts determining punishment severity constituted elements of a crime: "[o]ne need only look to the kind, degree, or range
of punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a given
set of facts. Each fact necessary for that entitlement is an element. '24 1
Justice Thomas justified this position on legal history. He concluded a seventeen-page historical survey by stating, "I simply note
that this traditional understanding-that a 'crime' includes every fact
that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment-continued well into the 20th-century, at least until the middle of the century."2

42

Justice Thomas then asserted that McMillan-in upholding

sentencing factors-had broken with the past:
It is fair to say that McMillan began a revolution in the law regarding
the definition of a "crime." Today's decision, far from being a sharp
break with the past, marks nothing more than a return to the status

238 Id.
239 Id. (ThomasJ., concurring).
240 Id. at 499-500 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
241 Id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also noted that "a 'crime'
includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment." Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring).
242 Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Knoll & Singer, supra note 183, at
1069-81).
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quo ante-the status quo that reflected
the original meaning of the
243
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Justice Thomas's comments illustrate the disjunction between the Apprendi and McMillan decisions.
Indeed, in the next part of the concurrence, in which Justice
Scalia did not join, Justice Thomas highlighted the consequences of
his concurrence. 244 Justice Thomas began the discussion by distinguishing, first, "what the Constitution requires the prosecution to do
in order to entitle itself to a particular kind, degree, or range of punishment of the accused" from, second, "what constitutional constraints
apply either to the imposition of punishment within the limits of that
entitlement or to a legislature's ability to set broad ranges of punishment. "245 Justice Thomas then expressly refused to consider the second category. 24 6 The constitutionality of sentencing under the
Guidelines falls most directly under this second category to the extent
that adjustments and departures raise concerns about the imposition
of punishment within the limits of entitlement. Although Justice
Thomas expressly declined to address these constitutional constraints,
aspects of his analysis of the first question-prosecutorial entitlement
requirements-may, in fact, affect the Sentencing Guidelines.
Justice Thomas noted several consequences that emerged from
his "common-law rule." First, Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.2 47 Because the defendant's prior convictions were used as a
basis to increase his sentence, those prior convictions should have
been proven to the jury: "the fact of a prior conviction is an element
in a recidivism statute. '248 Second, McMillan was wrongly decided: a
state's mandatory minimum entitled the government "to more than it
would otherwise have been entitled." 24 9 By virtue of this entitlement,
243 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) But see id. at 527-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Justice Thomas's historical justification for failure to cite cases prior to the
Bill of Rights and noting that "there is a crucial disconnect between the historical
evidence Justice Thomas cites and the proposition he seeks to establish with that
evidence").
244 Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
245 Id. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
246 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
247 Id. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the "error to which [he] succumbed" in joining Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Breyer to form a majority in Almendarez-Torres).
248 Id. at 521 (Thomas,J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted the special concern
of jury prejudice that led to treating recidivism differently but noted that "this concern ... does not make the traditional understanding of what an element is any less
applicable to the fact of a prior conviction." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
249 Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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the fact underlying the mandatory minimum constituted an element
of the crime.2

5

1

Third, Justice Thomas noted Apprendi's possible con-

sequences for Walton v. Arizona.25' In Walton, the court upheld Arizona's capital punishment scheme in which aggravated facts found by
ajudge determined eligibility for the death penalty. 25

2

Given that the

death penalty is a form of "greater punishment," Justice Thomas indicated the potential impact of Apprendi on the continued viability of
Walton.253 Noting, however, the unique context of capital punishment, Justice Thomas described the potential conflict as "a question
for another day." 254 In a footnote to this statement, Justice Thomas
also noted the potential consequences of the Apprendi rule upon the
Sentencing Guidelines:
It is likewise unnecessary to consider whether (and, if so, how) the
rule regarding elements applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, given
the unique status that they have under Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). But it may be that
this special status is irrelevant, because the Guidelines "have the
force and effect of laws." Id. at 413, 109 S.Ct. 647 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) .255

Although Justice Thomas expressly refused to consider the effects of
his "common-law rule" on the Guidelines, his second comment indicated that the Guidelines should not be treated differently than other
state and federal laws. Of the majority and concurring opinions, then,
Justice Thomas's opinion comes closest to an attack on the Guide25 6
lines, and his attack is indirect, at most.
250 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Thus, the fact triggering the mandatory minimum is part of 'the punishment sought to be inflicted'. . . ; it undoubtedly 'enters
into the punishment' so as to aggravate it ...and is an 'ac[t] to which the law affixes
...punishment.'" (citations omitted) (quoting i J. BistioP, LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50, 330, 51 (2d ed. 1872))).
251 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
252 Id.at 655-56.
253 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).
254 Id. at 523 (Thomas,J., concurring). Indeed, the Supreme Court partially overruled Walton under Apprendi reasoning. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)
(holding that the Arizona statute that required the judge to determine the presence
of aggravating factors upon a first degree murder conviction for the imposition of the
death penalty violated the Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial); see also infra Part
III.A.
255 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.l (Thomas, J., concurring).
256 While the recent overruling of Walton does not bode well for the Sentencing
Guidelines "question for another day," the Court's recent decision in Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), suggests that Apprendi has formal limits. Thus, Justice
Thomas's previous comments that the constitutionality ofjudicial and legislative sentencing range discretion is "quite another" issue than prosecutorial entitlements to
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5. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Jus2 57
Justice
tice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined..

O'Connor began by suggesting that the Apprendi decision represented
a "watershed change in constitutional law." 25 Rejecting the majority's

"bright-line rule," Justice O'Connor noted that "the Court cannot
identify a single instance, in the over 200 years since the ratification of
the Bill of Rights, that our Court has applied as a constitutional requirement, the rule it announces today." 259 Justice O'Connor then
reviewed and re-characterized the historical evidence cited by the majority and the concurring opinions and concluded,
In sum, the Court's statement that its "increase in the maximum
penalty" rule emerges from the history and case law that it cites is
simply incorrect. To make such a claim, the Court finds it necessary
to rely on irrelevant historical evidence, to ignore our controlling
precedent (e.g., Patterson), and to offer unprincipled and inexplicable distinctions between its decision and previous cases addressing
the same subject in the capital sentencing context (e.g., Walton).
The court has failed to offer any meaningful justification for deviating from years of cases both suggesting and holding that application
of the "increase in the maximum penalty" rule is not required by
2 6
the Constitution. 0
Justice O'Connor thus dismissed the underlying foundation of both
the majority and concurring opinions.
At least one of Justice O'Connor's characterizations of the majority and concurring opinions deserves specific mention. In examining
the majority's precedent, Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's distinction of McMillan v. Pennsylvania.26 1 Because the Court in McMillan upheld the use of a sentencing factor-a factor not proven to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt-to impose a minimum penalty, Justice O'Connor argued that it "point[ed] to the rejection of the
Court's [Apprendi] rule." 26 2 She further argued that "at least two" of
the Court's Apprendi formulations conflicted with McMillan: first, the
principle that "it is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from
the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalhigher punishment kinds, degrees, or ranges should be taken at face value. Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
257 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

258
259
260
261
262

Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
477 U.S. 79 (1986).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 532 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ties to which a criminal defendant is exposed"; 263 and, second, the
Court's endorsement ofJustice Scalia's concurring opinion in Jones v.
United States in which he wrote that "it is unconstitutional to remove
from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally pre' 264
scribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Court's holding as to increases or
alterations to the range of penalties "by definition, must include in265
creases or alterations to either the minimum or maximum penalties."
If accurate, her characterization of the majority's holding threatens
the Guidelines because of the constructive minimums created by
them. Following this characterization, Justice O'Connor alleged that
the Court did not narrow McMillan as justice Stevens had suggested,
but was, in fact, "overruling McMillan" without "explain [ing] why such
a course of action is appropriate under normal principles of stare
266
decisis."
Justice O'Connor's dissent reveals the consequences of carrying
the rationale of the Apprendi holding beyond its conclusion. Surely
she is correct in that some constitutional concerns surround sentence
minimums as well as maximums. Nonetheless, the language of the
majority opinion did not compel the result Justice O'Connor described. While the majority may have laid the groundwork for overturning McMillan, with the exception of Justice Thomas in his
concurrence, the majority Justices explicitly stated that they were not
so doing.26 7 McMillan's application, "to cases that do not involve the
imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for
the offense established by the jury's verdict," therefore stood under
Apprendi.268 Despite Justice O'Connor's characterization to the contrary, Apprendi did not make unconstitutional the use of sentencing
factors to impose a minimum punishment within the applicable statu269
tory range.
Justice O'Connor noted further concerns with the reasoning of
the majority and concurrence. First, she noted the disjunction be263

Id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 490 (quoting Jones v.

United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1998)) (emphasis added)).

264

Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting jones, 526 U.S. at 253 (Scalia, J., con-

curring) (emphasis added)).
265 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
266 Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
267 Id. at 487 n.13 (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (leaving open the possibility of over-

turning the narrower holding of McMillan but reserving that question "for another
day" given the probability of legislative reliance).

268

Id. (O'Connor,J., dissenting).

269

This interpretation was clarified, in a manner of

States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). See infra Part lII.A.

speaking, in Harris v. United
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tween Apprendi and Walton v. Arizona.270 While Walton upheld an Arizona statute requiring the judge to determine aggravating factors that
supported an increase in punishment (to death),271 Apprendi declared
sentencing under a similar scheme (outside the capital punishment
context) unconstitutional. 272 Second, Justice O'Connor proposed
that a state could avoid the Apprendi problem by altering its statutory
scheme. Theoretically a state could impose higher maximums at the
outset but allow judges to find the non-existence of certain factors
under the preponderance standard. 27 A judge finding the absence
of these factors could impose a lower statutory range. 274 Based upon
her formalistic reroute of the Apprendi problem, Justice O'Connor
suggested that the actual holding of Apprendi must be broader than
the majority admitted:
Given the pure formalism of the above readings of the court's opinion, one suspects that the constitutional principle underlying its decision is more far reaching. The actual principle underlying the
Court's decision may be that any fact (other than prior conviction)
that has the effect, in real terms, of increasing the maximum punishment beyond an otherwise applicable range must be submitted
2 75
to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice O'Connor relied upon this interpretation to raise concern
about the effect of Apprendi on determinate sentencing schemessuch as the federal scheme under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Before reviewing Justice O'Connor's discussion of the potential
consequences of Apprendi on the Sentencing Guidelines, a critique of
her underlying reasoning is warranted. As discussed previously, Jus270 497 U.S. 639 (1990). Because Walton was partially overruled recently in Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Justice O'Connor's conclusion appears well-founded.
See supra note 254; infra Part IlI.A.
271 Walton, 497 U.S. at 642-44.
272 See supra Part I.B.

273
274

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 542 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) Justice O'Connor suggested,
NewJersey could prescribe, in the weapons possession statute itself, a range
of 5 to 20 years' imprisonment for one who commits that criminal offense.
Second, NewJersey could provide that a defendant convicted under the stat-

ute whom a judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, not to have
acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual on the basis of race may
receive a sentence no greater than 10 years' imprisonment.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor suggested a relatively complex sentencing system. While the system might meet the formalistic requirements of Apprendi, the maJority opinion noted that her proposal might still suffer from
constitutional defects. Id. at 490 n.16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
275 Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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tice O'Connor may have been entirely correct to suggest that the majority's reasoning threatened determinate sentencing schemes. But
despite the theoretical threat, the sky had not yet fallen. First, the
majority expressly disclaimed that its opinion determined the'constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines.2 76 Second, when the Court
stated its rule in its own terms, it took care to state that any factor that
increased a sentence "beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" was required to be proved to the jury beyond reasonable doubt.2 77 Third,

the majority affirmed the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing

"within statutory limits." 27 8 Finally, Justice O'Connor based her fears

on a suspicion that the majority's holding "may be" that facts (other
than prior convictions) that increase maximum punishments "beyond
an otherwise applicable range" fall under the Apprendi rule. 279 Justice
O'Connor's entire premise sounds in speculation, therefore, and the
majority's explicit comments to the contrary require a contrary conclusion, namely, that Apprendi did not render sentencing under the
Guidelines unconstitutional.
Justice O'Connor registered grave concerns that Apprendi invalidated decades of sentencing reform and would throw the federal
criminal system into disarray. Characterizing the constitutional holding of the majority as entitling a defendant "to have ajury decide, by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact relevant to the determination of sentence under a determinate-sentencing scheme," Justice
O'Connor stated that Apprendi "will have the effect of invalidating significant sentencing reform accomplished at the federal and state
levels over the past three decades."2 8 1 Justice O'Connor then discussed the justifications behind determinate sentencing procedures276 Id. at 497 n.21; see also text accompanying note 231.
277 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
278 Id. at 481 (emphasis omitted).
279 1d. at 543-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). .Justice O'Connor
later stated that

[u]nder the Court's decision today, however, it appears that once a legislature constrains judges' sentencing discretion by prescribing certain
sentences that may only be imposed (or must be imposed) in connection

with the same determinations of the same contested facts, the Constitution
requires that the facts instead be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Id. at 546 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's position merits strong consideration. Indeed, the Court could easily extend its decision in the way Justice
O'Connor describes. One must note, however, that the Court did not go so far, at
least not in Apprendi. Whether one can justify or explain Apprendi's limitations and
distinctions on principle presents an entirely different question.
280 Id. at 549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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primarily the disparities in sentencing of similarly situated defendants.281 She also predicted a multitude of sentencing challenges by
prisoners in the federal system and confusion in future sentencing
procedures about the validity of sentencing under the Guidelines. 282
Justice O'Connor concluded her dissent by evaluating the New Jersey
statute and finding it constitutional under the Court's precedent, par283
ticularly McMillan.
6. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissent, to which ChiefJustice
Rehnquist joined. 28 4 Justice Breyer embarked on ajustification ofjudicial fact-finding and determinate sentencing. Calling the majority's
rule "a procedural ideal,"2 8 5 Justice Breyer suggested that the determi-

nation of sentencing factors by the judge reflected a "practical" reason-an "administrative need for procedural compromise" in the
286
criminal justice system.
Justice Breyer maintained that the system required administrative
compromise because of the multiplicity of facts involved in a criminal
sentencing and the potential for unfairness to the defendant. 28 7 Justice Breyer proceeded to consider two legislative solutions to sentencing problems-first, commissions to establish uniform guidelines, i.e.,
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and second, statutory specifications
regarding the use of certain sentencing factors. 288 Justice Breyer
noted that legislatures developed these solutions to combat disparity
289
in sentencing problems.
After he dismissed as irrelevant the majority's limit of its rule to
statutory maximums, 2 ° Justice Breyer concluded,
[T]he rationale that underlies the Court's rule suggests a principle-jury determination of all sentencing-related facts-that, unless
restricted, threatens the workability of every criminal justice system
281
282
283
284

Id. at 549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra Part L.A-B.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 552-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

285

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

286 Id. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
287 Id. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Here Justice Breyer raised the quintessential
problem-must the defendant contend, "'I did not sell drugs, but I sold no more
than 500 grams"'? Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
288 Id. at 560 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
289 Id. at 559-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 563 (Breyer, ..,dissenting).
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(if applied to judges) or threatens efforts to make those systems
29
more uniform, hence more fair (if applied to commissions). 1
Justice Breyer rejected this rationale and found New Jersey's sentenc29 2
ing statute valid under traditional sentencing practices.

7.

Opinion Summary

Before turning to the effects of Apprendi, the foregoing discussion
warrants a summary to review the Justice's positions on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines under the Apprendi rule. The
majority opinion did not reverse the holding of McMillan; it did limit
McMillan's holding to the extent the holding was not already so limited. The majority asserted that the Guidelines were not before it and
refused to consider the constitutionality of the Guidelines. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia raised doubts as to the constitutionality of the
Guidelines only in his concluding sentence, which asserted that the
jury should find all facts that prescribe punishment. This conclusion
should be read in light of Justice Scalia's earlier description of the
jury's fact-finding function as that of finding facts relevant to the statutory maximum. Justice Thomas in concurrence reserved the question
of the constitutionality of the Guidelines but suggested that the
Guidelines were entitled to no special treatment. Justice O'Connor in
dissent warned that the majority and concurrence reasoning would
have grave effects on the Sentencing Guidelines. Justice Breyer maintained the constitutionality of the Guidelines for practical reasons.
Thus, only the opinion of Justice Thomas explicitly advocated a position that might render the Guidelines unconstitutional.

111.

THE AFTERMATH OF APPRENDI IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Indeed, the federal courts have construed Apprendi relatively narrowly. The Supreme Court has answered in part two of the questions
it left unanswered in Apprendi, but it has not addressed specifically the
constitutionality of sentencing under the Guidelines in light of the
rationale expounded in Apprendi. While several Courts of Appeals
have reversed drug sentences based on Apprendi, no circuit has held
that Apprendi invalidated the federal sentencing guidelines procedure
as a whole. Not every post-Apprendi decision can be examined-as of
291
292

Id. at 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the time of writing, 4761 reported cases cited Apprendi 29 3-but several
deserve mention.
A.

The Supreme Court's Post-Apprendi Decisions

In a pair of cases handed down on June 24, 2002, the Supreme
Court addressed the substantive reach of Apprendi.29 4 In Ring v. Arizona,29 5 the Court used Apprendi reasoning to invalidate the Arizona
296
capital punishment scheme previously upheld in Walton v. Arizona.
297
In Harris v. United States, the Court declined to hold that Apprendi
overruled McMillan v. Pennsylvania. While the congruity among Apprendi and these cases may lie in the eyes of the beholder, the postApprendi decisions, especially Harris, suggest that sentencing under
the Guidelines will not be found unconstitutional. Rather, Apprendi
must stand for its narrow holding-facts increasing punishment beyond the statutory maximum for the crime of conviction must be
proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt-as opposed to a broader
rationale-all facts increasing punishment must be proved to a jury
beyond reasonable doubt. Apprendi must have formal limits, 29 8 and

statutory sentencing schemes should be parsed for their formal adherence to the narrow rule.
In Ring v. Arizona, the Court found unconstitutional Arizona's
death penalty conviction process. Under Arizona's capital prosecution scheme, ajury first determined a defendant's guilt for first-degree
murder. 299 Upon conviction, the judge, using a preponderance standard, determined the existence or non-existence of certain aggravating factors. 300 If at least one aggravating factor existed, and no
sufficiently substantial mitigating factors called for leniency, the judge
293 A search of Westlaw citing references, limited to reported cases, yielded this
number. KeyCite of Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466 (performed Apr. 3, 2003).
294 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545
(2002). The Supreme Court has also considered the procedural aspects of Apprendi.
See Cotton v. United States, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). In Cotton, the Supreme Court held
that Apprendi errors were subject to plain error review, thereby limiting pre-Apprendi

conviction relief. Id. at 631.
295 536 U.S. 584.
296

497 U.S. 639 (1990); see also supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.

297

536 U.S. 545.

298 Admittedly, this characterization directly conflicts with the Court's own characterization. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) ("[T]he relevant
inquiry is not one of form, but of effect."); see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (characteriz-

ing aggravating factors as the "'functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense"' (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19)).
299 Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.

300

Id.
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was authorized to impose the death sentence. 3 1 The Court upheld
this scheme in 1990 in Walton v. Arizona.3 °2
1 Twelve years later, Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court in Ring, explained that "Apprendi's
reasoning is irreconcilable with Walton's holding in this regard," and
the Court held that "[c]apital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury

determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an in' 3
crease in their maximum punishment.
Justice Ginsburg noted that the Apprendi majority had distinguished Walton.314 The majority in Apprendi had reconciled Walton by
determining that the statutory maximum provided under the Arizona
scheme was death, and that "'it may be left to the judge to decide
whether that ... ought to be imposed.'" 30 5 Relying in part on Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi and the Arizona Supreme Court's determination that Justice O'Connor had the better argument, Justice
Ginsburg concluded the majority opinion by asserting, "Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment
requires that they be found by a jury. ''130 6 In the capital punishment
context, the Court appeared to give Apprendi a broad and functional,
as opposed to a narrow and formal, construction.
The Court's opinion was not unanimous. 3 7 Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice Thomas, concurred, citing the "accelerating propensity" of
state and federal legislatures to adopt "sentencing factors." 3°81 Justice
Scalia then asserted that those factors "must be subject to the usual
requirements of the common law, and to the requirement enshrined
in our Constitution, in criminal cases: they must be found by the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 19 Justice Kennedy also concurred, affirming his view that Apprendi was wrongly decided but acquiescing in
"

301
302

Id. at 592-93.
497 U.S. 639 (1990); see atso id. at 648 (noting and rejecting defendant's char-

acterization of the factors as "elements of the offense" rather than "sentencing
considerations").
303 Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
304 Id. at 602.

305

Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000)).

306

Id. at 609 (citation omitted) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).

307

Id. at 587.

308 Id. at 611-12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
309 Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also criticized Justice Breyer's
decision to concur. Because Justice Breyer refused to acquiesce in the Apprendi hold-

ing,Justice Scalia suggested, "There is really no way in which Justice Breyer can travel
with the happy band that reaches today's result unless he says yes to Apprendi. Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong flight; he should either get off before the
doors close, or buy a ticket to Apprendi-land." Id. at 613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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its holding. 3 1°1 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, citing his
belief that "jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated by the Eighth
Amendment."3 1 1 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented.3 12 Justice O'Connor, restating her conviction that
Apprendi "was a serious mistake,

'3

1" described the majority's overturn-

ing of Walton as an expansion of Apprendi that "exacerbates the harm
done in that case." 31 4 The judgment was thus seven to two, with six

Justices joining the majority opinion, and five Justices supporting the
3 15
Apprendi decision.
Read separately, Ring might suggest a substantial expansion of
Apprendi beyond its formal holding. In Apprendi, the Court held that
facts that increase punishment beyond the statutory maximum must
be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In Ring, the Court
invalidated the Arizona statute because the aggravating factors were
not proven to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt, even though the statute under which the defendant was sentenced to death did provide
for a capital conviction (upon the later finding of aggravating factors).
Seemingly, the defendant was not punished beyond the statutory maximum, and yet Apprendi controlled, rendering the sentence constitutionally invalid. Despite this apparent rejection of the narrow
Apprendi holding-note Justice Ginsburg's comments as to functional
equivalence 316 -the facts authorizingthe defendant's capital sentence
were found by the sentencing judge alone under the sentencing
scheme. The jury verdict alone did not authorize a capital conviction.
In this sense, the judge did sentence beyond the maximum penalty
authorized by the jury conviction, violating the formal Apprendi rule.
The Court's application of Apprendi in Harris v. United States,3 17 the
second case delivered on June 24, 2002, reinforces this interpretation.
In Harris, the Court upheld a defendant's mandatory minimum
conviction and refused to overturn McMillan v. Pennsylvania.3 1 8 In
Harris, the defendant was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1) (A) for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug
310 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
311 Id. at 614 (Breyer,.J., concurring).
312 Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
313 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
314 Id. at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
315 Id. at 587. The five Justices supporting Apprendi were Justices Stevens, Scalia,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Souter.
316 See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
317 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
318 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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trafficking offense." 19 Under §924(c)(1) (A), a defendant faces
mandatory minimums depending upon whether the firearm was simply carried, or whether it was brandished or discharged. 211 Writing
for five members of the Court,3 2 1 Justice Kennedy performed a statutory analysis of § 924(c) (1) (A), and determined that the brandishing
and discharge factors were sentencing factors and not elements of the
crime. 32 2 Then Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality of the
Court, 323 proceeded to distinguish McMillan from Apprendi. Justice
Kennedy asserted that Apprendi did not undermine McMillan because
Apprendi was based on the historical practice of submitting facts authorizing maximum punishment to the jury, and there was "no comparable historical practice" of submitting facts determinative of
mandatory minimums to the jury.32 4 Justice Kennedy reconciled McMillan and Apprendi with this statement:
Read together, McMillan and Apprendi mean that those facts setting
the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it,
are the elements of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional
analysis. Within the range authorized by the jury's verdict, however,
the political system may channel judicial discretion-and rely upon
judicial expertise-by requiring defendants to serve minimum
terms afterjudges make certain factual findings. It is critical not to
25
abandon that understanding at this late date.1
Thus, Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion emphasizes the limitation of
the rule of Apprendi to statutory maximums-its formal limit.
As in Ring, the Court's opinion was fractured. Justice O'Connor
concurred and reaffirmed her belief that Apprendi was wrongly decided.3 21 3 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and concurred in
part in the opinion but did not concur injustice Kennedy's reconciliation of McMillan and Apprendi: "I cannot easily distinguish Apprendi v.
New Jersey, from this case in terms of logic. For that reason, I cannot
agree with the plurality's opinion insofar as it finds such a distinction. '3 2 7 Justice Breyer then proceeded to express disapproval at the
319
320

Harris, 536 U.S. at 550.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000); see also Harris, 536 U.S. at 550-51.
321 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Breyer joined this
part of the opinion. Harris, 536 U.S. at 549.
322 Id. at 550-56.
323 The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, but not Justice Breyer,
joined this portion of the opinion. Id. at 549.
324 Id. at 563 (suggesting that the "Apprendi rule did not extend to those facts").
325 Id. at 567.

326

Id. at 569 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

327

Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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use of mandatory minimums.3 28 Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting

329
Jusopinion, which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined.

tice Thomas asserted, "The Court's holding today therefore rests on
either a misunderstanding or a rejection of the very principles that
animated Apprendi just two years ago."' ' 0 Justice Thomas then proceeded to explain that the rule of Apprendi dictated that the facts underlying the defendant's mandatory minimum sentence be proven to
the jury beyond reasonable doubt and that considerations of stare decisis did notjustify upholding McMillan.33

1

Justice Thomas concluded

by noting that only a minority of the Court supported the distinction
between Apprendi and McMillan33 2 and that one of the Justices (Justice
O'Connor) in support of the distinction did not support the Apprendi
case itself. 333 As Justice Thomas pointed out, the Harris Court only

weakly upheld the McMillan precedent in its justification of the use of
sentencing factors to impose mandatory minimums.
Although Harrisaddressed judicial fact-finding for the imposition
of mandatory minimums dictated by the legislature, the holdingwhile weakly supported-bodes well for the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Sentencing Guidelines effectively create mandatory minimums
(and maximums) within the statutory maximum ranges. If legislative
mandatory minimums are permissible, then the Sentencing Commission's effective mandatory minimums should be equally constitutionally permissible.
This conclusion depends, in part, upon the strength of the Harris
precedent. Justice Thomas suggested that Harris conflicts with Ap328 Id. at 570 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Mandatory minimum statutes are fundamentally inconsistent with Congress' simultaneous effort to create a fair, honest, and
rational sentencing system through the use of Sentencing Guidelines.").
329 Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
330 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also justified his dissent in this
way: "[g]iven that considerations of stare decisis are at their nadir in cases involving
procedural rules implicating fundamental constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants, I would reaffirm Apprendi, overrule McMillan, and reverse the Court
of Appeals." Id. at 572-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas's justification is
not apropos, however, if McMillan can be logically reconciled with Apprendi, and it
seems that the understanding of Apprendi upon which Justice Thomas most relies is

that of his concurrence.
331 Id. at 573-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
332 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined the portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion distinguishing McMillan and Apprendi. See id. at
549; see also id. at 557 ("McMillan and Apprendi are consistent because there is a funda-

mental distinction between the factual findings that were at issue in those two cases.").
333 Id. at 583 (Thomas,J., dissenting) ("Because, like most Members of this Court,
I cannot logically distinguish the issue here from the principles underlying the

Court's decision in Apprendi, I respectfully dissent.").
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prendi.334 Harris certainly suggests the formal limitations of the Apprendi rule. Adopting for a momentJustice Thomas's characterization
of conflict between Harris and Apprendi,335 not all the Justices have
been entirely consistent in their voting patterns. Justice Scalia has
voted inconsistently-joining the majority opinion in Apprendi and
Justice Thomas's Apprendi concurrence but then joining Justice Kennedy's majority and plurality opinion in Harris.Justice Kennedy has
also voted inconsistently-joining the majority opinion in Apprendi,
but then writing the majority and plurality opinion in Harris. In addition to these "inconsistencies," Justice Breyer refused to recognize the
33 6 These
reconciliation of McMillan with Apprendi in Harris.
factors
combined, the Harrisprecedent illustrates more than a modicum of
instability.
Contrary to Justice Thomas's assertions, the three Apprendi decisions can be reconciled, but only on narrow, formal grounds. If the
Apprendi rule means only that all factors, except recidivism, 33 7 that increase the statutory maximum authorized by a conviction must be
proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt,3381 then Apprendi, Ring,
and Harris are consistent. In Apprendi, the defendant was sentenced
beyond the maximum penalty in the statute of conviction. In Ring,
the jury conviction did not authorize the death penalty. Rather, the
legislature removed the aggravating factors for separate determination by the judge; absent the judge's findings, death could not be imposed. In Harris, the defendant was sentenced at a mandatory
minimum level, not above the statutory maximum for the crime. If
the principle of Apprendi is consistently limited in this way, then the
Sentencing Guidelines would likely be upheld as constitutional under
the Supreme Court's post-Apprendi decisions.

334 Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 330.
335 If a conflict in fact exists, it is a conflict between a broad rationale and a narrow
rule, with Justice Thomas characterizing Apprendi as representing the broad rationale
endorsed by his concurrence.
336 Nonetheless, Justice Breyer is unlikely to declare unconstitutional a sentencing
scheme that implicates the Sentencing Guidelines. SeeJustice Stephen Breyer, Justice
Breyer: FederalSentencing Guidelines Revisited, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1999, at 28 (commenting upon the efficacy of the Guidelines and noting his own involvement with their
development).
337 See infra note 381.
338 Incidentally, this is an almost verbatim statement of the holding of Apprendi.
See Apprendi v. New.lersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to ajury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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Sentencing High: Apprendi's Effect on Drug Convictions
in the Lower Courts

Lower courts have wrestled with Apprendi's effects on sentencing
under the Guidelines, particularly in the context of drug convictions.
The United States Code prescribes different statutory maximums for
drug-related convictions based on the amount of drugs proved present. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally "manufacture, distribute or dispense, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance" or "create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance. '"'3 9 Subsection (b) of
§ 841 sets out separate ranges of punishment for this prohibited behavior based on the amount of the drug manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, possessed, or created. 34°1 Section 846 makes it unlawful to
attempt or to conspire to commit any of the acts prohibited in the
subchapter, including § 841, and provides the same penalties for such
attempt or conspiracy as for the corresponding act.3 41 Sections 841
and 846, therefore, provide several statutory maximums. The factual
mass of the drugs in evidence determines the applicable statutory
range.
Given the statutory scheme of § 841, Apprendi requires drug
quantity to be proven to a jury beyond reasonable doubt to establish
the appropriate statutory maximum. 3 42 If the jury fails to find the
quantity of drugs supporting the charge, the judge alone cannot find
that quantity under the preponderance standard to qualify for an increased statutory maximum. Such ajudicial finding would violate the
defendant's rights to due process and a jury trial.3 43 When a judicial
finding under the preponderance standard increases the statutory
maximum penalties, the rule of Apprendi is violated. 344 This interpretation led to a flurry of federal appeals for defendants convicted of
drug offenses in which the court determined the quantity under the
preponderance standard and sentenced the defendant to a higher
339 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000).
340 Id. § 841(b).
341 Id. § 846.
342 See, e.g.,
United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that because amount of marijuana was not proven tojury, the judge's finding that
the defendant possessed a specified amount "increase[d] the penalty for [the] crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" and violated the rule of Apprendi (quoting
Apprendi, 530 at 490)).
343 Id. at 1057.
344 Id. at 1059.
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penalty than would have been available for an unspecified amount
345
conviction.
Despite this apparent Apprendi requirement, some courts have
upheld convictions under the higher statutory maximum, even
3 46
though amount was not proven to thejury. In United States v. Nealy,
the Eleventh Circuit held that Apprendi "did not recognize or create a
structural error that would require per se reversal."3

47

Relying upon

34

the doctrine of harmless constitutional error,
the court held that
failure to prove the amount of drug possessed by the defendant was
''3 49
harmless because the "amount was uncontested at trial and sentencing.
The Nealy court then affirmed the defendant's conviction although
the sentence was based on the higher of the § 841 statutory maximums, and although the amount of drug possessed had not been
50
proven to the jury.1

In United States v. Heckard,351 the Tenth Circuit also upheld a drug
conviction sentence despite lack of proof of amount to the jury. In
reviewing the district court's sentence for plain error, the appellate
court held that no substantial rights of the defendant were affected by
failure to prove the amount of drugs to ajury because the defendant's
sentence fell within the lower statutory maximum.3 5 2 Other circuits
353
have reached similar results.
The federal circuits have thus indicated a willingness to limit the
effects of Apprendi, even in drug cases. Combining these courts' reasoning, an Apprendi error only occurs when the defendant contests the
amount of drugs present; the prosecution fails to prove the amount,
345

See B. Patrick Costello, Jr., Comment, Apprendi v. New Jersey: "Who Decides

What Constitutes a Crime?" 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205, 1257-58 (2002).

346

232 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2000).

347

Id. at 829.

348

Id. (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)).

349

Id. at 830.

350 Id.
351 238 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2001).
352 Id. at 1235.
353 See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding a life sentence for defendant although the jury did not find specific drug quantities because the statutory maximum for drug charges was a life sentence); United
States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding a twenty-year sentence
imposed under § 841(b) (1) (A) for defendant convicted of possessing cocaine base
with intent to distribute although quantity was not proven to the jury because a
twenty-year sentence was within the statutory maximum provided under

§ 841 (b)(1) (C) for an unspecified quantity); United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 123
(4th Cir. 2000) (upholding a sentence where drug quantity was considered by the

district court because the sentence fell within the statutory range for an unspecified
drug quantity conviction).
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and the court sentences the defendant under the higher of available
statutory maximums.
C.

Stemming the Tide: Federal Reception of Other Apprendi Challenges

With the exception of drug convictions with different statutory
maximums, federal courts have not attempted to apply a broad Apprendi rationale to the Guidelines.3 54 Sentencing under the Guide-

lines-within the statutory maximum for the crime of convictionbased upon facts not proven to the jury, has been upheld in a variety of
contexts by every circuit to consider the issues. 355 Upon Apprendi challenges, the federal courts of appeals have upheld the use of guideline
cross-references, 35

6

enhancements,

3 57

and

aggravating

factors. 358

Only one circuit panel expanded the Apprendi requirements to factors
354 This reluctance contrasts with the original susceptibility of the Guidelines to
constitutional challenge when first implemented in 1988. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk et
al., Chartingthe Influences on the JudicialMind: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Reasoning,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1403 (1998) (noting that 60.9% of federal district judges
invalidated the Guidelines upon constitutional challenge).
355 HUTCHISON ET AL., supra note 6, § 6A1.3, at 1531.
356 See, e.g., United States V.Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding use of a murder cross-reference under the Guidelines, although the defendant
was not charged with murder nor was that conduct proven to the jury, as long as use
of the cross-reference did not extend the sentence beyond the statutory maximum of
the crime of conviction).
357 See United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding sentencing enhancement on a conspiracy to transport illegal aliens charge
based upon the intentional or reckless creation of a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury).
358 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding
the district court's determination of monetary loss under a preponderance standard
as a sentencing factor); United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235-36 (10th Cir.
2001) (upholding district court's consideration of drug quantity as an aggravating or
mitigating factor in establishing the offense level under the Guidelines when that
consideration did not result in a sentence above the statutory maximum); United
States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding district court's sentencing where drug quantity was determined by the district court under a preponderance
standard but sentence did not exceed statutory maximum); United States v. Williams,
235 F.3d 858, 862-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding sentencing based in part on drug
quantity not proven to the jury when the sentence imposed did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum); Angle, 230 F.3d at 123 (allowing the use of drug quantity
to act as an aggravated factor where the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum for an unspecified quantity drug charge); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d
528, 542 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court's determination of relevant conduct-conspiracy to commit murder-on a preponderance standard to determine
the offense level for a RICO charge).
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that increased sentencing within the statutory range,3 59 and that panel
decision was quickly "clarified" upon rehearing.3 60
In addition to applying only the narrow Apprendi holding, several
courts have commented upon Apprendi's effect on the Guidelines.
For instance, in United States v. Heckard,: 6 1 the Tenth Circuit panel
noted that the Apprendi majority had "specifically avoided disrupting
the use or adequacy of the Sentencing Guidelines."3 62 The Seventh
Circuit recognized the import of Justice Thomas's concurrence and
noted the possibility that Apprendi could be extended to cover the Sentencing Guidelines, but declared that "the majority in Apprendi did
not extend its rule in this manner, and we decline to extend Apprendi
in such a fashion today."3 63

In United States v. Garcia,3 64 the Second

Circuit summarized the Apprendi comments regarding the Guidelines
by discussing both "the alarms sounded by the dissenters" and the
footnote in Justice Thomas's concurrence..3 65 The court concluded,
"Until advised to the contrary by the Supreme Court, we do not believe that a sentencing judge's traditional fact-finding has been replaced by a requirement of jury fact-finding."' 366 With this language
the courts have indicated their intention to follow the letter of Apprendi but to go no further without explicit guidance from the Supreme Court.
This reaction by the lower federal courts has not gone unnoticed
by the academy. In an early response to Apprendi, Professor Chemerinsky noted that courts were mostly choosing a "narrow interpretation" of Apprendi.36 7 He also predicted that courts would "struggle
with [Apprendi] on a daily basis"3 68 until the Supreme Court provided
further clarification. In a later article, Professor Susan Herman noted
the lower courts' reluctance to apply Apprendi and suggested that following the courts' decisions "is like watching the construction of a
359 United States v. Fields, 242 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Apprendi
applied to role-in-offense findings under the Guidelines), reh'g, 251 F.3d 1041 (D.C.

Cir. 2001).
360 United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (clarifying that
Apprendi does not reach "role-in-offense" findings because such a "finding is not a
'fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum' (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (1999))).

361

238 F.3d at 1222.

362
363
364

Id. at 1236 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481).
United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 636 (7th Cir. 2001).
240 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2001).

365
366
367
368

Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 184.
Chemerinsky, supra note 142, at 104.
Id.
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barricade: case after case selects from a dazzling array of procedural
excuses to explain why each particular defendant should not reap Apprendi's benefits. ''1-3t Thus, scholars have described the monumental
consequences implicated by Apprendi but have also recognized the
choice by federal courts to constrain those consequences until instructed otherwise by the Supreme Court.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. SENTENCING GuIDEIINES

The federal courts have correctly interpreted the Apprendi decision. Despite the warnings of the dissenters, and the lone footnote in
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, the Court stated on multiple
occasions that it did not determine the constitutionality (or unconstitutionality) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Absent these statements, the reasoning of the Court might have supported an assertion
that the facts used to determine a sentence under the Guidelines must
be charged and proven to the jury or, a fortiori, that the use of adjustments and enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutional. The majority, however, refuted this characterization of its
holding. To interpret Apprendi to require the proof of any fact relevant to sentencing-in other words, to declare sentencing under the
Guidelines unconstitutional-would interpret Apprendi beyond its
holding and in contradistinction to expressions in the majority opinion. While the majority's comments on the Guidelines may have been
only dicta, those comments support and clarify the holding of Apprendi: facts extending punishment beyond the statutory maximum
must be proven to the jury.
In Harris,the Court confirmed this interpretation. By upholding
mandatory minimums and the McMillan decision, the Court suggested that its reasoning was limited to ceilings, not floors.3 711 The
effect of the Guidelines is to impose constructive floors (and ceilings)
within the applicable statutory range. But even these "floors" are not
absolute-judges may depart. Because only a plurality of the Court
accepted the Harrisdistinction of Apprendi and McMillan, the constitutionality of the Guidelines remains something of an open question.
369 Herman, supra note 147, at 617.
370 Despite several contrary suggestions by members of the Court, a distinction
can be drawn between ceilings and floors. Society should have statutory notice of the
maximum penalty attached to a crime. While, ultimately, a defendant may care just as
much about the minimum penalty, the mandatory minimums are something of a new
phenomenon. There is no tradition of notice as to a minimum penalty because sentencing was previously indeterminate. If the Apprendi rule is based on the traditional
right to notice as to elements of a crime, limitation of this rule to statutory maximums
makes sense.
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But at a minimum, Harris suggested that a formal interpretation of
the Apprendi precedent is appropriate.
Apprendi and its predecessor, United States v. Jones,37 1 focused on
the constitutional rights of defendants to have notice of the crimes
with which they are charged and to have all elements of these crimes
proven to the jury beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional substance is thus satisfied through primarily formal requirements. Indeed, Justice O'Connor suggested in Apprendi that the majority's
requirements could be satisfied by mere formal changes to the statute
under which the defendant was charged.3 72 While the majority essentially dismissed this suggestion, the formality required by Apprendi and
discussed by Justice O'Connor warrants consideration. In the area of
crime definition, formality for formality's sake is not unreasonable.
Defendants should have at least constructive notice of the elements of
the crime. Facts that constitute a crime should be proven to a jury.
Judges should sentence within the confines of the jury conviction.
The narrow and formal Apprendi holding is, therefore, quite
reasonable.

3 73

In Apprendi, the defendant was subject to a higher penalty than
that prescribed by the statutory maximum. If the judge found the
existence of racial bias as a motivating factor, an additional sentencing
scheme was provided. The defendant was never charged with acting
out of racial bias, however, and did not have notice of this potential
charge and higher penalty in the statute under which he pled
guilty.3 74 The Sentencing Guidelines work differently. 3 75 Although
specific facts determined by the judge may provide higher penalty
ranges within the guideline ranges, the defendant is not sentenced
outside the statutory range. Sentencing under the Guidelines has not
violated the formal requirements of Apprendi because nothing has altered the defendant's notice as to the elements of the crime under the
statute.
If the formal distinctions will not support a differentiation between the Apprendi reasoning and the Sentencing Guidelines, then
one must turn to considerations of policy. As discussed previously,
Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission and conferred au371
372

526 U.S. 227 (1999).
See supra notes 273-75.

373 But see Costello, supra note 345, at 1269-70 (arguing that the Supreme Court
came to an "incorrect conclusion" in Apprendi).

374 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000). The facts suggest, however,
that Apprendi did have notice of the enhanced penalty at the time of his plea entry.

Id.
375

See supra Part I.C.2.
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thority to develop the Sentencing Guidelines.37 6 Congress apparently
took these steps in an effort to restore faith in sentencing and to harmonize widely variant sentencing. The effort was not made to destroy
discretion but rather to structure it. The effort was also an attempt to
safeguard criminal rights. In fact, the Sentencing Guidelines have
brought a measure of consistency and uniformity to federal sentencing.3 7 7 Similarly situated criminals, under the Guidelines, will generally be sentenced within a narrowed range, a range well within the
broad statutory range for the crime of conviction.
In developing the guidelines system, the legislature statutorily expressed intent to provide a coherent and fair system of punishment.
While a legislative statement of good faith alone cannot save the
Guidelines from constitutional flaw if one exists, it is relevant to note
that Congress and the Court both apparently seek the same endfairness to criminal defendants. Given such a unitary goal, only a
manifest defect should rise to constitutional stature. An incongruous
historical record-one from which the concept of mandatory minimums was absent-does not create such a defect. 378 Furthermore, in-

validation of the guidelines system has the potential to restructure the
relationship between the branches-by redefining the legislature's elements of a crime, 37 9 and restricting the judiciary's control over the
sentencing portion of a criminal trial.
It is difficult to conceptualize how sentencing under a broad Apprendi scheme would be accomplished. 38 0 Would the Sentencing
Guidelines simply disappear and unfettered judicial discretion return?
Presumably, under this alternative, facts influencing sentencing would
not require proof beyond reasonable doubt to a jury because they
would be indeterminate. Surely one of the motivations underlying
376

See supra Part I.A.

377 Nonetheless, many commentators have expressed concern about the adequacy
Berman, supra note 60.
of the Guidelines and their usage. See, e.g.,
378 See supra note 370.
379 For a contrary argument that "the guidelines do not represent a legislative decision about what should be a sentencing factor and what should be an element of an
offense," see Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S.CAL. L. REV.
289, 337 (1992). Eight years prior to Apprendi, Herman argued that judicial factfinding under the Guidelines and pursuant to McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79
(1986), had the potential to deny defendants due process. Herman, supra, at 356.
380 For a more comprehensive exploration than that of this Note, see Andrew M.
Levine, The ConfoundingBoundaries of 'Apprendi-land": Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 445-46 (2002) (advocating a requireGuidelines sentencing factors that
ment thatjuries find beyond a reasonable doubt all
mandate an increase in the sentencing offense level).
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Apprendi-notice to defendants-would be at odds with a return of
fully indeterminate sentencing.
Under a second alternative, perhaps the Guidelines would remain, but any relevant factors-beyond recidivism-would have to be
charged in an indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. Should this requirement take effect, the sentencing procedure
might lose the aspect of individuality because prosecutors would not
likely take up the procedural burden of proving such "elements." Or,
conversely, prosecutors might take up the burden selectively in highprofile cases. Should prosecutors take up these burdens of proof, defendants could be prejudiced by the introduction of extrinsic evidence relevant only to sentencing and not relevant to the elements of
the crime as defined by Congress'
Potentially, under such a scheme,
the tail of sentencing wags the dog of the crime. 8s 2 In other words,

the punishment drives the conviction. That the "wagging" would occur outright, in the indictment and at trial, creates a different concern
than that which originally prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist's canine
metaphor in McMillan, but it creates concern nonetheless. If all sentencing factors must be proven, then the elements of punishment
would drive the conviction with the prosecution-and not Congressin control of the elements charged. "11 In addition and in relation to
381 This reason seems to lie behind the Apprendi exception for recidivism. Justifying the exception under a broad Apprendi rationale is difficult. If all facts relevant to
punishment must be proven to the jury, why the exception for recidivism? Some principle may be buried in the theories of punishment. Society may have a greater need
to incapacitate an individual convicted of multiple crimes because of that individual's
apparent propensity to commit crime. And so, the recidivism factor is relevant to
sentencing. Propensity to commit crime (or character) is not, however, directly relevant to the commission of any individual crime. And so, recidivism might be excepted from the factors considered by the jury in determining guilt or innocence. If,
however, all facts relevant to increased punishment are effectively elements of the
crime that should be proven to the jury, then, to the extent that recidivism is relevant
to increased punishment, it also should be proven to the jury, and the distinction
cannot be justified. Cf.Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 235 (1999) (noting that
the Court in Ahnendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), "stressed the history of treating recidivism as a sentencing factor, and noted that, with perhaps one
exception, Congress had never clearly made prior conviction an offense element
where the offense conduct, in the absence of recidivism, was independently
unlawful").
382 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88. The Chief Justice used the metaphor to explain
how certain factors might be inappropriately regarded as only sentencing factors
when they are, in fact, of such magnitude as to constitute an element of the offense.
Such factors require proof at the conviction stage, not merely at sentencing. Id.
383 Cf Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines:Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775 (2002), Standen augurs the effect of Apprendi on
prosecutorial strength:
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this concern, most criminal cases do not proceed to jury trial. The
effect of a broad Apprendi interpretation on the plea bargaining system is enormous, partially because of the power and discretion transferred to prosecutors..3 84 Given these realities, it is unclear what, if
any, actual rights and values a broad Apprendi interpretation would
protect. It seems such an interpretation would increase the power
shift to prosecutors and effectively endorse disparity in sentencing.
Sentencing under the Guidelines within statutory ranges is not
unconstitutional. The Apprendi decision does not compel a contrary
answer; in fact, the majority specifically rejected the suggestion that it
had determined (or undermined) the constitutionality of the Guidelines. While a narrow reading of Apprendi may be formalistic, formalism has an important role in criminal law. In Harris, the Court
affirmed the narrow, formal construction. Finally, for reasons of policy, the constitutionality of the Guidelines should be upheld. To decide differently would invalidate decades of sentencing reform
without means for putting into practice a more desirable (read "fair")
alternative.
CONCLUSION

What was constitutional before the Sentencing Guidelines cannot
be unconstitutional after the Sentencing Guidelines.3 8 5 Before the
Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing courts had discretion to consider
real offense factors and harms. The Guidelines structured the appropriate factors for consideration and effectively provided that the factors would receive uniform weight in federal sentencing courts. The
Guidelines-as evidenced by legislative history, the Commission's Mission Statement, and the Guidelines' very structure-are essentially designed to cabin judicial discretion and promote fairness to offenders
in sentencing, not to remove elements of a crime from the jury's
consideration.
Even if the Court does not adopt Justice Thomas' perspective, Apprendi will
initiate the demise of guidelines sentencing. Prosecutors and legislators who
prefer harsher anticrime measures will grow accustomed to working with Apprendi and will come to like it for the same reason they have come to like
guidelines sentencing. Apprendi further empowers prosecutors, giving them
greater leverage in shaping sentencing outcomes.
Id. at 797-98 (citations omitted).
384 For a comprehensive discussion of this problem, see Stephanos Bibas, Judicial
Fact-Findingand Sentence Enhancenents in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALe L.J. 1097
(2001).
385

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 546-47 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting).
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In determining relevant conduct and departures under the
Guidelines, a sentencing court is merely exercising judicial discretion
to consider real offense factors and harms in a structured way. It is
not determining the elements of the crime. While sentence severity
may increase, as long as punishment is not increased beyond the statutory maximum, the sentencing court has not sentenced the defendant
to a different crime than that proven to the jury. Tradition, theory,
and pragmatism do not counsel or compel a different constitutional
requirement.
While the various Justices in Apprendi expressed somewhat different opinions on the matter, no Justice explicitly held that the Guidelines were unconstitutional. In fact, the majority specifically rejected
the dissenters' suggestion that Apprendi compelled an invalidation of
sentencing under the Guidelines. It reserved that question for another day.
Should the Court decide that sentencing under the Guidelines is
unconstitutional, it could drastically change the dynamics of federal
sentencing. In the process, it would go no further toward providing
an analytically sound definition of a crime or a coherent theory of
criminal punishment. Despite the Court's best efforts, some factors
not relevant to the "crime" itself will undoubtedly be considered in
fashioning punishment-whether by the judge or jury.38 6 Congress
has decided that this unavoidable circumstance is best resolved
through structured judicial discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Court should respect this legislative determination because
the Sixth Amendment right is maintained under the Guidelines
structure.
If or when the Supreme Court answers the remaining Apprendi
"question for another day," it should uphold the constitutionality of
the Sentencing Guidelines. While notice to defendants and the right
to a full jury trial are constitutional necessities, not every fact relevant
to sentencing is an "element" of the "crime," nor must every fact relevant to sentencing be proven to ajury beyond reasonable doubt. The

Court has already recognized this distinction in excepting proof of
recidivism from the Apprendi requirements. To answer the question
differently under the ambit of Sixth Amendment protection would be
an unreasonable distortion of the constitutional right without the
promise of greater justice.

386

And through the exercise of discretion in charging, by the prosecutor as well.

